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Redefining Tribal Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental
Rights
MICHAEL DORAN*
This Article explains a longstanding problem in federal Indian law. For two
centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the retained,
inherent sovereignty of American Indian tribes. But more recently, the Court has
developed the implicit-divestiture theory to deny tribal governments criminal and
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, even with respect to activities on tribal lands.
Legal scholars have puzzled over this move from a territorial-based definition of
tribal sovereignty to a membership-based definition; they have variously explained
it as the Court’s abandonment of the foundational principles of Indian law, the
product of the Court’s indifference or even racist hostility to Indians, or a simple
lack of doctrinal coherence in the Court’s decisions. This Article provides a different
explanation. The implicit-divestiture cases represent the Court’s effort to address a
trilemma among three incompatible objectives: preservation of the traditional,
territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty, preservation of tribal governments’
placement outside the federalist structure of the constitutional order, and
preservation of fundamental rights. The Court has chosen to resolve the trilemma by
redefining tribal sovereignty to deny tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Whether
right or wrong, the implicit-divestiture theory is the Court’s good-faith attempt to
preserve as much tribal sovereignty as possible without infringing on fundamental
rights or forcing tribal governments into the federalist structure.

* Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. For comments and criticisms, many
thanks to Matthew L.M. Fletcher, John Harrison, Caleb Nelson, and Cynthia Nicoletti. Ma
soprattutto grazie a Diana Finzi.
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INTRODUCTION
Jones murders Smith. What government has jurisdiction to prosecute Jones? The
answer usually includes, at a minimum, the government in whose territory the crime
occurred. If Jones murders Smith in the District of Columbia, the U.S. government
has criminal jurisdiction; the citizenship and even residence of Jones and Smith are
irrelevant. Either or both might be citizens or residents of the United States; either or
both might be citizens or residents of Canada or France or the Republic of South
Africa. Their physical presence in the District of Columbia at the time of the murder
is dispositive for the U.S. government’s criminal jurisdiction (setting aside the
complication that Jones might leave the District of Columbia or even the United
States after the murder but before the trial). The same is true if Jones murders Smith
in Massachusetts or California. In that case, Massachusetts or California has
jurisdiction to prosecute Jones. Again, the citizenship and residence of Jones and
Smith are beside the point; all that matters is that Jones murdered Smith within the
borders of Massachusetts or California (and, again, that Jones remains in or can be
forced to return to Massachusetts or California). Ordinarily, the reasoning behind this
is as straightforward as the result. Ordinarily, a government has sovereignty over
everyone and everything within its territory, and ordinarily, that sovereignty includes
the general power to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction. But there is an entirely
different set of rules for Indian tribal governments.
Beginning in 1978 and continuing to the present, the U.S. Supreme Court has
steadily narrowed tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over individuals who are not
tribal members and entities that are not owned or controlled by tribal members. 1

1. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 226–42 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
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Under current law, an American Indian tribe generally may not assert criminal
jurisdiction over a non-Indian, and it may assert civil jurisdiction over a nonmember
only in limited circumstances. Increasingly, these restrictions do not turn on whether
the underlying activity takes place within Indian country. In other words, the
trajectory of the Supreme Court’s case law is to define tribal governmental authority
not in terms of territory but in terms of membership.2 This development troubles
legal scholars.3 If Indian tribal governments are sovereign—a point made repeatedly
by the Supreme Court4—why should tribal governments not have full criminal and
civil jurisdiction over their territories, as is true for other sovereigns? Why should
tribal sovereignty be defined differently?
For a very long time the Supreme Court did define tribal sovereignty and tribal
jurisdiction in terms of territory. In its 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court ruled that state law stops at the border of Indian country 5 and that,
within that border, tribal sovereignty prevails, subject only to whatever authority
might be given up by treaty with the federal government or taken away by federal
statute.6 That baseline rule of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty and tribal
jurisdiction over everyone and everything within Indian country generally endured
for a century and a half.7 As a member of the Supreme Court put the point during

2012); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL43324, TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS:
A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2013). An important note: The Supreme Court’s cases on tribal
jurisdiction do not always distinguish clearly between adjudicative and prescriptive
jurisdiction, particularly on the civil side. Where feasible, I distinguish between “civiladjudicative jurisdiction” and “civil-regulatory jurisdiction.” But often, I simply elide the two
with the admittedly ambiguous word “jurisdiction.”
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra Part II.
4. As recently as 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed, in dicta, the “pre-existing
sovereignty” of the Indian tribes. Puerto Rico v. Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016).
5. Federal Indian law does not provide a comprehensive definition of “Indian country.”
For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, “Indian country” currently is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Thus, Indian country includes all lands within the boundaries of a
reservation, even lands that are owned in fee simple by non-Indians, and all lands outside the
boundaries of a reservation that are owned in fee simple by an Indian tribe or by members of
an Indian tribe. By common practice, the definition in the federal criminal code is used in civil
matters as well. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 184. In this
Article, I use the terms “Indian country” and “reservation” interchangeably, and I use the term
“tribal lands” to refer to land within a reservation (Indian country) that is owned by the tribe,
by tribal members, or by the United States in trust for the benefit of the tribe or tribal members.
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
7. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, United States v. Lara, 531 U.S. 193
(2004).
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oral argument just fifteen years ago: “[I]f you go back a couple hundred years, they
[the tribes] clearly had their own inherent power to try nonmembers.” 8 But in 1978,
the Supreme Court, with no forewarning, held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
that a tribal government cannot assert criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, even
for a crime committed within Indian country.9
Over the following two decades, the Supreme Court extended the Oliphant
reasoning to deny tribes criminal, civil-regulatory, and civil-adjudicative jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians.10 Congress has enacted limited reversals of those decisions
on the criminal side but otherwise has given the Court a wide berth.11 As recently as
2016, the Supreme Court came within a single vote of denying tribes all civiladjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers. 12 This change from the traditional,
territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, membershipbased definition presents a vexing question for federal Indian law—and, in the view
of advocates for tribal interests, it amounts to a very serious assault on tribal
sovereignty.13 The Supreme Court itself has not settled on a single explanation for
why tribal sovereignty should be so different from nontribal sovereignty. 14 The Court
often treats the point as though it were self-evident; other times, the Court offers
shifting or contradictory explanations for it.15
Legal scholars have spent considerable time and effort on the puzzle.16 Several
analyses argue that the Supreme Court has abandoned the foundational principles of

8. Id.
9. 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
10. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (civil-adjudicative jurisdiction);
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (criminal jurisdiction); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 565–67 (1981) (civil-regulatory jurisdiction).
11. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
made in 1991, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); 25 U.S.C. §
1304 (2013) (amendment made by the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013,
restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for certain domestic-violence and
dating-violence offenses).
12. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per
curiam) (upholding tribal civil-adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendant), aff’g by
an equally divided court sub nom. Dolgencorp v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d
167 (5th Cir. 2014).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Section I.A.
15. See infra Section I.A.
16. See, e.g., DEWI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT’S
SILENT REVOLUTION (2016); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (1997); CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE (2005); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005); Russell Lawrence Barsh and James
Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting
of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979); Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the
U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and
Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901; Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction
over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Bethany R. Berger,
Liberalism and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 813 (2006); Robert
N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-Colonialism and the Supreme Court’s
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New Indian Law, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 92 (1991); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002); Richard B. Collins, Implied
Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1979); Allison M.
Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty:
The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit
Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353 (1994); N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the
Quest for a Principled Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State Conflict,
21 VT. L. REV. 47 (1996); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 (2014); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and
Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121 (2006); Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness:
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499 (2013); Philip P. Frickey,
A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754
(1997); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context,
Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through
the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433 (2005); David H. Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (1996); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s
Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267
(2001); L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996); L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty
After Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2003); Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil
Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
1187 (2010); John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s
Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731 (2006); Jacob T. Levy, Three
Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 329 (2008); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391
(1993); Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal
Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48 (2010); Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38
CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006); Thomas P. Schlosser, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers,
37 TULSA L. REV. 573 (2001); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme
Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes,
39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation
that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 767
(1993); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country,
10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49 (2017); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense out of Nevada v.
Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347 (2001); Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal SelfGovernment and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105; Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the
Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s
Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in
Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267 (2000); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism
in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard Case Easy:
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federal Indian law, including the concept of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. 17
On these accounts, towering figures from the past—primarily Chief Justice John
Marshall, who wrote the seminal opinions on the relationship of Indian tribes to the
federal and state governments, and Felix Cohen, who first restated federal Indian law
as a coherent whole in the twentieth century—had developed a compelling legal
model of tribal sovereignty under which tribal governments are subordinate only to
the express will of Congress. But, these accounts continue, the contemporary
Supreme Court’s unwillingness or inability to grasp the necessary implications of
those foundational principles has led the Court to the membership-based definition
of tribal sovereignty.
More pointed analyses argue that the Supreme Court is affirmatively hostile to
tribes and tribal sovereignty.18 Whether because they generally discount the rights
and the interests of all racial and ethnic minorities, because they consider Indian
tribes to be an anomaly within the federalist system, or because the justices are
unapologetic racists, the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, these accounts
maintain, have actively undermined tribal sovereignty through what historian Ned
Blackhawk calls “common law colonialism.”19 Other analyses conclude that the
whole corpus of the Supreme Court’s Indian law is simply incoherent.20 There is no
point, these accounts argue, in trying to find any conceptual order in the decisional
chaos.
Perhaps these explanations are correct in part, but none is correct in whole. To a
greater or lesser extent, these analyses overlook or minimize two important points.
First, the Supreme Court has not categorically abandoned or repudiated tribal
sovereignty. During the same term that it denied tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians in Oliphant, the Supreme Court affirmed the longstanding concept of
retained, inherent tribal sovereignty in two leading cases—Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, which held that federal courts generally may not review tribal-court
interpretations of the federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,21 and United States v.
Wheeler, which held that a tribal government and the federal government are separate
sovereigns for purposes of the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy. 22
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions, most notably in the area of tribal sovereign
immunity, have stated repeatedly that Indian tribes have retained, inherent

Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
288 (2003); Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment and
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147 (1999–2000); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219.
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. See infra Section II.B.
19. Ned Blackhawk, A New History of Native Americans Responds to ‘Bury My Heart at
Wounded Knee’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/books
/review/david-treuer-heartbeat-wounded-knee.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/XYB2-E5R4].
20. See infra Section II.C.
21. 436 U.S. 49, 52 (1978).
22. 435 U.S. 313, 328–30 (1978).
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sovereignty.23 Against those authorities, arguments that the Supreme Court has
rejected tribal sovereignty are misplaced.
Second, in the years since World War II, the Supreme Court’s decisions outside
Indian law have turned toward the wholesale expansion of fundamental rights. This
is the rights revolution largely associated with the Warren Court—but with roots in
the Stone and Vinson Courts and with continuing vitality through the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.24 From criminal procedure and civil liberties to
private property and the free exercise of religion, the contemporary Supreme Court
has reorganized large tracts of public law around fundamental rights. Long gone are
the days when Justice Holmes and Justice Frankfurter maintained a posture of
judicial deference to the political branches, and long gone are the days when few
provisions in the Bill of Rights applied to state and local governments. Today, an
overriding concern of the Supreme Court is with the rights of individuals against the
government, from the federal level all the way down to the lowest level of local
government. But the Indian tribes have no formal place within this framework; the
Constitution places tribal governments entirely outside the federalist structure. No
less importantly for these purposes, the rights provisions of the Constitution—
including the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment—do not apply to tribal
governments. The rights revolution and tribal sovereignty simply do not intersect.
That is where the trouble starts. I argue that the Supreme Court fully understands
retained, inherent tribal sovereignty; more controversially, I argue that the Supreme
Court wants to preserve retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. But the Supreme Court
also wants to preserve and, in many cases, enlarge the fundamental rights that it has
recognized, created, expanded, and incorporated in the postwar period.25 And it
wants to preserve the placement of tribal governments outside the federalist structure.
Those objectives are incompatible; the Court cannot achieve all three
simultaneously. This presents the Supreme Court with a classic trilemma. The Court
can pursue any two of the objectives, but it necessarily must compromise the third.
If tribal governments exercise full territorial sovereignty over Indian country but
remain outside the federalist structure, nonmembers must lose their fundamental
rights with respect to tribal governmental action. If tribal governments exercise full
territorial sovereignty over Indian country but nonmembers can assert their
fundamental rights against tribal governmental action, tribal governments must be
forced into the federalist structure and treated as though they were state or local
governments. And if tribal governments remain outside the federalist structure but
nonmembers retain their fundamental rights, tribal governments must lose their
territorial jurisdiction. Forced to choose among these outcomes, the Supreme Court
has moved from the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to
the contemporary, membership-based definition. For the Court, this approach best
accommodates the competing claims of tribal sovereignty, fundamental rights, and
the constitutional limits of federalism.

23. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 787–88 (2014); Kiowa
Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–58 (1998); Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130, 136–52 (1982).
24. See infra Section I.B.
25. See infra Section I.C.
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My thesis is straightforward. The line of Supreme Court cases restricting tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers redefines tribal sovereignty for the era of fundamental
rights. In the view of the Supreme Court, the traditional, territorial-based definition
of tribal sovereignty worked tolerably well before the rights revolution. Contact
between tribal governments and nonmembers was infrequent; and in any event,
critical provisions of the Bill of Rights lay dormant or unincorporated even against
the states. From the Court’s perspective, no great harm came from allowing tribal
governments to assert jurisdiction over nonmembers and non-Indians in Indian
country. But once it began to view its constitutional role as including the protection
of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court became increasingly troubled by the
territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty. What sense did it make, the Court
asked, to force Arizona or Wyoming to respect the fundamental rights of its citizens
if those citizens lost their rights as soon as they entered the Navajo Nation or the
Wind River Indian Reservation? The resolution that the Supreme Court has pursued
since Oliphant is to cast tribal sovereignty in terms of membership rather than
territory. That, in my view, is the best explanation for this challenging line of cases.
My argument should not be misunderstood. For the most part, my objective is to
offer an interpretive account, not a normative one. I am not arguing that the Supreme
Court’s redefinition of tribal sovereignty is the right answer to the tribal-sovereignty
trilemma. Because of the longstanding scholarly questions about those cases, I am
interested primarily in understanding what the Supreme Court has been doing, not
what the Supreme Court should be doing. In general, my sympathies lie with those
who favor a more robust form of tribal sovereignty, but I try to set those sympathies
aside for the sake of a clearer analysis of the Court’s decisions. Even if I conclude
that the Supreme Court is normatively mistaken, I must also conclude that these cases
represent an intelligent, good-faith attempt to preserve tribal sovereignty. For that
reason, I cannot agree with the scholarly views that the Court’s contemporary Indianlaw cases are uninformed, incoherent, hostile, or racist.
The argument is set out as follows. Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s new
definition of tribal sovereignty as the Court’s resolution of the tribal-sovereignty
trilemma. This part examines the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal
sovereignty dating back to the Marshall Court, explains the historical developments
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that brought Indians and non-Indians
into more frequent contact, recounts the rights revolution of the postwar decades, and
explains more fully how the contemporary, membership-based definition of tribal
sovereignty represents a choice among incompatible objectives. Part II reviews
competing explanations in the scholarly literature and identifies their shortcomings,
limitations, and (in some cases) errors. Part III moves beyond the interpretive
approach of Part I and the critical approach of Part II to consider possible paths
forward. In that part, I argue that what may be the most desirable outcome—
revitalizing the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty—may
also be the least attainable. Similarly, I argue that what may be the easiest outcome—
full incorporation of tribal governments into the constitutional order—may also be
the least desirable. Instead, the law seems likely to continue down the Supreme
Court’s chosen path until it reaches the end point of tribal sovereignty based entirely
(or very nearly entirely) on tribal membership.
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THE TRIBAL-SOVEREIGNTY TRILEMMA

The Supreme Court has long recognized the retained, inherent sovereignty of
American Indian tribes—a sovereignty that predates contact with the European
colonizing powers and that, accordingly, does not derive from the U.S. Constitution,
from acts of Congress, or from decisions of the Supreme Court.26 And the Court long
defined this sovereignty in terms of territory—so that each tribe was sovereign with
respect to that tribe’s lands. But in 1978, the Court changed course and began to
define tribal sovereignty in terms of membership.27 Although the doctrinal shift was
abrupt, the legal, political, and demographic developments underlying it had
unfolded over the previous century.28 To the Court, the redefinition of tribal
sovereignty in terms of membership rather than territory appeared to provide the best
resolution of an intractable conflict among competing positions in federal Indian and
constitutional law.29
The underlying problem is a classic trilemma. The assertion of tribal criminal and
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers implicates three incompatible legal objectives.
First is the preservation of the traditional definition of tribal sovereignty—that is, the
sovereignty of tribal governments over all persons and all activities on tribal lands.
Second is the preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist
structure—that is, the exemption of tribal governments from the constraints imposed
on the federal and state governments by the individual-rights provisions of the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Third is
the preservation of those fundamental rights—that is, the assurance to all persons
that, under the Constitution, the exercise of governmental power cannot violate

26. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 206–11; see also
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). A 1934 opinion of the solicitor of the Interior
Department summarized the law on this point in the following terms:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions hereinafter analyzed, is the principle that those powers which are
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted
by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with
the Federal Government as a sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and
legislation.
Opinion of the Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior, 55 I.D. 14, 1 Opinions
of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to Indian Affairs, 1917–1974, 445,
447 (Oct. 25, 1934) [hereinafter Department of the Interior] (emphasis in original).
27. E.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of
Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 17–
78 (1993); Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 609–13 (2010). L. Scott Gould
describes the membership-based definition of tribal sovereignty as organized under a “consent
paradigm.” See generally L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996). Dewi Ioan Ball refers to this development as a
“silent revolution.” DEWI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT’S
SILENT REVOLUTION 67–138 (2016).
28. See infra Section I.B.
29. See infra Section I.C.
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certain basic rights such as the free exercise of religion and the right against selfincrimination. These three objectives present a trilemma; any rule concerning tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers can realize two—but not all three—of the objectives
simultaneously.
The problem is directly analogous to what economists know as the “MundellFleming Trilemma” (also called the “Impossible Trinity”).30 The Mundell-Fleming
Trilemma holds that the policy objectives of fixed currencies, monetary autonomy,
and capital mobility cannot all be realized at the same time. 31 A simple depiction of
that trilemma places the three incompatible objectives at the vertices of a triangle and
locates the policy outcomes, which are determined by choosing any two of the three
objectives, along the sides of the triangle.32 Following that approach, the tribalsovereignty trilemma may be depicted as follows, with the three competing
objectives indicated in boldface at the vertices of the triangle and the three possible
outcomes indicated in italics along the sides of the triangle.

30. Joshua Aizenman, The Impossible Trinity (a.k.a. The Policy Trilemma) 3–5 (May 15,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Indiana Law Journal).
31. Id. at 3–4.
32. Id. at 17 fig.1.
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Consider now the options for resolving the trilemma. The Supreme Court might
decide to realize the two objectives located at the upper and lower right vertices of
the triangle—the preservation of the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal
sovereignty and the preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the
federalist structure. Selection of those two objectives would lead the Court to the
outcome on the right side of the triangle, allowing tribal governments to assert full
jurisdiction over all persons and all activities within tribal lands but not allowing
individuals to assert fundamental rights as trumps over tribal governmental power.
Under this approach, the Court would have to sacrifice the objective at the lower left
vertex—that is, the objective directly opposite the chosen outcome; it would not be
able to preserve fundamental rights in the context of tribal sovereignty. Thus, a tribal
court, for example, would not be required to observe the limitations of the Fourth or
Fifth Amendment in a criminal trial.
The Supreme Court might decide instead to realize the objectives located at the
upper and lower left vertices—the preservation of the traditional, territorial-based
definition of tribal sovereignty and the preservation of fundamental rights. Selection
of those two objectives would lead the Court to the outcome on the left side of the
triangle, allowing tribal governments to assert full jurisdiction over all persons and
all activities within tribal lands and allowing individuals to assert their fundamental
rights as trumps over tribal-governmental power. But the Court would have to
sacrifice the objective directly opposite the policy outcome—in this case, the
preservation of the tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist structure. In
effect, tribal governments would be forced into the federalist structure and treated as
state and local governments under the Incorporation Doctrine.
The Court instead has pursued the third approach. The Court effectively has
decided to realize the objectives located at the lower right and the lower left
vertices—the preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist
structure and the preservation of fundamental rights.33 That has led the Court to the
outcome on the bottom side of the triangle, denying tribal sovereignty over
nonmembers. Correspondingly, the Court’s approach has sacrificed the objective at
the top vertex—the preservation of the traditional, territorial-based definition of
tribal sovereignty. In deciding not to incorporate constitutional rights protections
against tribal governments but to preserve fundamental rights as trumps on
governmental power, the Court left itself with no choice but to redefine tribal
sovereignty.
The Supreme Court has not articulated its decisions in these terms, and there have
been fits and starts along the way as the Court has worked through the specific
implications of the doctrinal turn initiated by Oliphant.34 Additionally, Congress at
times has intervened to overturn particular decisions denying tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers and non-Indians.35 But all the same, this trilemma framework best
explains how and why the Court has undertaken to redefine tribal sovereignty. A
fuller understanding of the trilemma requires an appreciation of how it arose during
the last quarter of the twentieth century. That, in turn, requires a closer examination

33. See infra Section I.C.
34. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see infra Section I.A.
35. See supra note 11.
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of the Court’s tribal-sovereignty cases, the substantial legal and demographic
developments within Indian country since the nineteenth century, and the emergence
of the fundamental-rights era during the decades after the Second World War.
A. Tribal Sovereignty Redefined
Law normally defines sovereignty in territorial terms. The government of the
United States claims sovereignty over all lands within its borders and over certain
overseas territories and possessions. So too does the Hellenic Republic; so too does
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And consistent with that,
the government of the United States, along with the governments of the fifty
constituent states, generally asserts criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons
and activities within its lands, as do the governments of Greece and the United
Kingdom with respect to their lands. The relationship between sovereignty and
territorial-based jurisdiction is so close that it almost seems tautological: to claim
sovereignty is very nearly the same as asserting jurisdiction over everyone and
everything within the claimant’s territory, and to assert jurisdiction over everyone
and everything within the claimant’s territory is very nearly the same as claiming
sovereignty. “A basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty,” says the U.S. Supreme
Court, “is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign’s
territory, whether citizens or aliens.”36
But the relationship is so close only because it is so familiar, not because it is
strictly necessary. Jurisdiction can be defined in other terms. The Germanic barbarian
kingdoms of the early Middle Ages, for example, divided jurisdiction by ethnicity
and tribe, not by geography.37 A Salic Frank was entitled to the benefits of Salic law
no matter where he or she happened to be; similarly, a Burgundian was entitled to
Burgundian law, and a Visigoth was entitled to Visigothic law.38 And for centuries
after overrunning the western empire, the Germanic barbarians generally continued
to apply Roman law to the Romans.39 Jurisdiction was personal rather than territorial,
even if sovereignty was territorial rather than personal.
For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court defined tribal sovereignty in territorial
terms. The touchstone decision is the 1832 opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in
Worcester v. Georgia.40 The Georgia legislature, as part of a broader effort to destroy
the government of the Cherokee Nation and to open Cherokee lands for non-Indian

36. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990).
37. ANTONIO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, A HISTORY OF LAW IN EUROPE: FROM THE EARLY MIDDLE
AGES TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 27 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
38. LAWS OF THE ALAMANS AND BAVARIANS 17–18 (Theodore John Rivers trans., 1977);
THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS 8 (Katherine Fischer Drew trans., 1991). But see PATRICK
WORMALD, THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW: KING ALFRED TO THE TWELFTH CENTURY,
LEGISLATION AND ITS LIMITS 31 (1999).
39. LAWS OF THE ALAMANS AND BAVARIANS, supra note 38, at 17; THE BURGUNDIAN
CODE 4 (Katherine Fischer Drew trans., 1972). Barbarian law normally applied only to
relations between barbarians and, possibly, to relations between barbarians and Romans;
Roman law continued to apply to relations exclusively between Romans. There were,
however, exceptions to this principle. THE LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS, supra note 38, at 8.
40. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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settlement, passed a statute that, inter alia, proscribed “white persons” from residing
in Cherokee lands without first pledging loyalty to the constitution and the laws of
Georgia and obtaining a license from the Georgia governor. 41 Samuel Worcester, a
non-Indian Congregationalist minister who lived and worked among the Cherokees
and who ignored the pledge and license requirements, was convicted under the
Georgia statute and sentenced to four years of hard labor.42 Over one dissenting vote,
the Supreme Court held the Georgia statute unconstitutional and reversed
Worcester’s conviction.43 In the majority opinion, Marshall reasoned that the Indian
Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gave the federal
government—rather than the individual states—the exclusive power to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes.44
No less importantly, Marshall articulated a vision of tribal sovereignty as
territorial and subordinate only to the power of the U.S. government. Marshall wrote
that various statutes passed by Congress, including the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1802,45 “manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries within which their authority is
exclusive.”46 He added:
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its own
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.47
Marshall, then, plainly stated that the reach of state law ends at the border of Indian
country and that Indian law, subject only to overriding federal law, controls within
Indian country. In the words of Judge Canby, one of the leading scholars of federal
Indian law: “Worcester leaves little question that in Marshall’s view, the tribes were
inherently empowered to govern everything that happened within their territories.
The boundaries of tribal power were essentially geographical . . . .”48
This territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty generally remained in effect
until 1978, although federal Indian law occasionally strayed from Worcester. In 1817
(fifteen years before Worcester), Congress had passed the Indian Country Crimes
Act, which confers federal jurisdiction over mixed-race crimes within Indian
country—that is, crimes involving an Indian victim and a non-Indian offender or an

41. Id. at 542.
42. Id. at 540.
43. Id. at 562–63. The Court also reversed the conviction of Worcester’s codefendant,
Elizur Butler. Id. at 597.
44. Id. at 557–62.
45. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802, Pub. L. No. 7-13, 2 Stat. 139 (1802).
46. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
48. William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1987). Cf. Philip. P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15
(1999) (arguing that principles supporting “tribal geographical sovereignty” were unstable).
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Indian offender and a non-Indian victim.49 But the Indian Country Crimes Act simply
introduces federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian country; it does not displace tribal
criminal jurisdiction.50 In fact, the Indian Country Crimes Act permits a tribe to
preempt federal criminal jurisdiction by punishing an Indian offender before the
offender is subjected to federal prosecution.51 In 1885, Congress passed the Major
Crimes Act, which confers federal jurisdiction over certain felonies within Indian
country involving an Indian offender and an Indian victim.52 Again, however, the
Major Crimes Act apparently does not preempt concurrent tribal criminal
jurisdiction, although the question remains unsettled.53 Between those two statutes,
the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, provides that “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”54 The proviso (“subject to
the jurisdiction thereof”) excluded tribal members, implying that tribal jurisdiction
over tribal members was not limited to tribal lands—a point later confirmed by the
Supreme Court.55 It does not, however, imply that tribal governments lack
jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal lands.
More difficult to reconcile with Worcester are the Supreme Court’s 1881 decision
in United States v. McBratney56 and its 1896 decision in Draper v. United States.57
In each of those cases, the Court ruled that the state government, rather than the
federal government, had criminal jurisdiction over a crime committed within Indian
country by a non-Indian offender against a non-Indian victim. 58 McBratney and
Draper do not specifically say that tribal governments lack jurisdiction over such
crimes, but the flat inconsistency of those decisions with the Worcester language
about state laws having “no force” within Indian country suggests as much.
McBratney and Draper effectively hold that Indian country is not Indian country
when a non-Indian commits a crime against a non-Indian. If the non-Indian status of

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990). See also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 767–69. A federal statute enacted in 1953 and known
generally as “Public Law 280” confers criminal and civil jurisdiction on state governments for
certain matters within Indian country. Id. at 537–78. The grant of state jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 is not inconsistent with the territorial-based definition of sovereignty in
Worcester because, where it applies, Public Law 280 simply delegates to the states all or part
of the federal jurisdiction recognized by Worcester.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). In Elk, the Supreme Court held that a tribal
member who had been born on tribal lands, who had moved to non-tribal lands, who had
renounced his tribal membership, but who had not been naturalized was not a U.S. citizen
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 94. Later, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924
conferred U.S. citizenship on all Indians. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
56. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
57. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
58. Id.. at 247; 104 U.S. at 624.

102

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:87

the offender and the victim displaces federal jurisdiction, it presumably displaces
tribal jurisdiction as well.59
Nonetheless, the territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty generally
remained in place well into the twentieth century. In 1934, the solicitor of the
Department of the Interior described the criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts
in territorial terms:
So long as the complete and independent sovereignty of an Indian tribe
was recognized, its criminal jurisdiction, no less than its civil
jurisdiction, was that of any sovereign power. It might punish its subjects
for offenses against each other or against aliens and for public offenses
against the peace and dignity of the tribe. Similarly, it might punish aliens
within its jurisdiction according to its own laws and customs. Such
jurisdiction continues to this day, save as it has been expressly limited
by the acts of a superior government. 60
In the opinion of the solicitor, then, the original criminal and civil jurisdiction of
the Indian tribes “was that of any sovereign power.” This included power over a
tribe’s own “subjects” and over “aliens.” That jurisdiction persists, the solicitor
argued, “save as it has been expressly limited by the acts of a superior government”—
which, of course, includes federal statutes and decisions such as McBratney and
Draper.61
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the territorial-based definition of tribal
sovereignty in 1959, when it decided Williams v. Lee.62 In that case, the Court held
that the Arizona state courts had no jurisdiction to hear a civil suit brought by a nonIndian plaintiff against an Indian defendant for collection of a debt arising from a

59. Between McBratney and Draper, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex parte Crow Dog
effectively relied on the territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty from Worcester. 109
U.S. 556 (1883). In that case, the Court reversed the federal conviction of Crow Dog, a
member of the Sioux Tribe, who had murdered Spotted Tail, also a member of the Sioux Tribe,
on a Sioux reservation within the Dakota Territory. The Court determined that no statute or
treaty conferred federal jurisdiction over a crime committed within Indian country by one
tribal member against another tribal member, thereby recognizing exclusive jurisdiction for
the Sioux. Id. at 567–72. As with the Cherokee in Worcester, the Sioux were sovereign within
Sioux lands, unless and until the Sioux surrendered their sovereignty by treaty or Congress
took it from them by statute. To the contrary, however, was an 1878 decision of the Circuit
Court in the Western District of Arkansas, which held that the Cherokee Nation lacked
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (W.D. Ark.
1878).
60. Department of the Interior, supra note 26, at 472. Subsequent memoranda from the
solicitor, however, are in tension with that opinion or even contradict it. See, e.g., id. at 699,
736, 849, 872.
61. Id. at 472. As recently as 2001, one member of the Supreme Court referred to the 1934
solicitor’s opinion as stating that “the tribes under [the] Acts passed by Congress had the basic
sovereignty that they had for generations, unless it was taken away.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 5, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
62. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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transaction within Indian country.63 After reviewing Worcester,64 Justice Black’s
majority opinion stated that “Congress has . . . acted consistently upon the
assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a
reservation.”65 In upholding exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction, Black argued: “[T]o
allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here . . . would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He
was on the Reservation, and the transaction with an Indian took place there.”66 The
Supreme Court, Black concluded, has “consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations . . . . If this power is to be taken away from them,
it is for Congress to do it.”67
The Court followed Williams in its 1975 decision United States v. Mazurie.68 In
that case, two non-Indians had been convicted in federal court of “introducing
spirituous beverages into Indian country” in violation of a federal statute that allowed
Indian tribes to control the sale of alcohol on their lands. 69 In a unanimous decision,
Justice Rehnquist held that the non-delegation doctrine did not invalidate the federal
statute.70 Citing Worcester, Rehnquist wrote that “Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory.”71 The Court held it irrelevant that the non-Indian defendants “could not
become members of the tribe, and therefore could not participate in tribal
government.”72 Williams, the Court said, had already established “that the authority
of tribal courts could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their transactions
on a reservation with Indians.”73 Thus, allowing for the important but limited
McBratney and Draper exception of a crime committed by a non-Indian against a
non-Indian within Indian country, the Supreme Court from Worcester through
Mazurie consistently defined tribal sovereignty in territorial terms.
That changed abruptly in 1978 when the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe.74 The Court in Oliphant held that an Indian tribe has no
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, even for an offense committed against an
Indian within Indian country.75 In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the convictions
of two non-Indians who, in separate incidents on the Port Madison Indian
Reservation, had been arrested by tribal police and charged with resisting arrest,

63. Id.
64. Id. at 218–19.
65. Id. at 220.
66. Id. at 223.
67. Id.
68. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
69. Id. at 545.
70. Id. at 557.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 548. Sarah Krakoff notes that “Mazurie thus affirmed the Williams approach to
questions of tribal authority over nonmembers: absent acts of Congress, tribes retain their
inherent authority to regulate their internal affairs, including when such regulation affects nonIndians.” Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical
Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1203 (2010).
74. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
75. Id. at 195.
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assaulting a tribal officer, reckless endangerment, and damaging tribal property.76
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion comprised two distinct arguments. Rehnquist
argued first that, although “[t]he effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . is a relatively new phenomenon,” 77 Indian tribes
had never been understood by Congress, the executive, or the lower federal courts to
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders.78 Academic commentators
generally have criticized this part of the opinion as historically inaccurate. 79
Of much greater significance is the second argument, setting out what is now
known as the “implicit-divestiture theory.” 80 In that part of the opinion, Rehnquist
said that, by submitting to the authority of the U.S. government, Indian tribes
necessarily lost certain attributes of sovereignty—that the tribes have been implicitly
divested of particular sovereign powers by reason of their dependent status. 81 Among
these lost attributes of sovereignty, Rehnquist wrote, are the legal capacity to alienate
tribal lands to any transferee other than the U.S. government82—that had been the
holding of the Marshall Court’s 1823 decision in Johnson v. McIntosh83—and the
legal capacity to treat directly with foreign governments84—that had been part of the
reasoning of the Marshall Court’s 1831 decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.85
The Oliphant opinion thus reached back a century and a half to Johnson and
Cherokee Nation, devised the implicit-divestiture theory to explain them, and turned
that implicit-divestiture theory directly against tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. “By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States,”
Rehnquist concluded, “Indian tribes . . . necessarily give up their power to try nonIndian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.” 86
The decision was a major blow to advocates of tribal sovereignty. By 1978, it had
long been understood that, apart from the two exceptions recognized by Johnson and
Cherokee Nation, Indian tribes retain all attributes of sovereignty other than those
specifically surrendered by treaty or agreement with the United States and those
specifically taken away by act of Congress. Now Oliphant indicated that the judiciary
would place further limits on tribal sovereignty, subject only to the possibility of
legislative override. To compound matters, the opinion did not establish how far the
implicit-divesture theory might reach. On the criminal side, the Court ultimately
determined that the theory reaches very far. In its 1990 decision Duro v. Reina, the
Supreme Court, relying on the implicit-divestiture theory, held by a 7-2 vote that an

76. Id. at 194.
77. Id. at 196–97.
78. Id. at 196–206. Rehnquist conceded that the Supreme Court had never before
addressed the question. Id. at 197. Instead, he pointed to Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353
(W.D. Ark. 1878), as the only prior federal court decision denying (or even considering)
whether tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 199–200.
79. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 228.
80. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206–12.
81. Id. at 208–11.
82. Id. at 209.
83. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
84. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
85. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
86. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
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Indian tribe cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction for a crime committed within Indian
country by an Indian who is not a member of the tribe.87 The decision actually created
a jurisdictional gap such that no government—federal, state, or tribal—had
jurisdiction for certain offenses committed by nonmember Indians.88 Congress
quickly addressed that, overturning Duro by statute,89 and the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the remedial legislation in United States v. Lara.90 As a result,
an Indian tribe today may exercise criminal jurisdiction over any Indian, whether or
not a member of the tribe, but it may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over a nonIndian, except with respect to certain offenses specified in the federal Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968.91
In the meantime, the Supreme Court turned the implicit-divestiture theory against
tribal civil-regulatory and civil-adjudicative jurisdiction. In its 1981 decision
Montana v. United States, the Court, relying on Oliphant, unanimously held that an
Indian tribe cannot regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on lands within
Indian country that are owned in fee simple by nonmembers.92 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stewart said that tribal authority is confined primarily to matters affecting the
tribe and its members to the exclusion of matters affecting nonmembers: “[E]xercise
of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and
so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”93
But Stewart also wrote that the prohibition on tribal civil-regulatory jurisdiction
is not absolute. Under what are known as the “two Montana exceptions,” Stewart
said that a tribe may exercise civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers for
activities on nonmember lands if the nonmembers enter into “consensual
relationships” with the tribe or its members or if the nonmembers’ “conduct threatens

87. 495 U.S. 676, 684–96 (1990). The majority opinion in Duro, citing Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957), offered an analogy between the trial of a nonmember by a tribal court and
the trial of a civilian by a military court: “Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on
the ability of Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal
that does not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right.” 495 U.S. at 693–94.
88. Id. at 696–98.
89. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, made
in 1991, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
90. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
91. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (2013) (amendment made by the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for certain
domestic-violence and dating-violence offenses).
92. 450 U.S. 544, 557–67 (1981). Although Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
dissented in part from the Court’s opinion, they disagreed only with a portion of the Court’s
opinion concerning ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River. The dissent specifically
“agree[d] with the Court’s resolution of the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate nonIndian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe”—
that is, the implicit-divestiture portion of the opinion. Id. at 581 n.18 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). After Oliphant but before Montana, the Court had held that the implicit-divestiture
rationale of Oliphant did not prevent a tribe from taxing cigarette sales made by the tribe to
nonmembers on tribal lands. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980).
93. 450 U.S. at 564.
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or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.”94 Furthermore, Stewart said unequivocally that a tribe
may exercise civil-regulatory jurisdiction over a nonmember for activities on tribal
lands.95 Under Montana, then, the implicit-divestiture theory restricts a tribe’s civil
jurisdiction less than it does a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction. Oliphant categorically
denies criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians even on tribal lands within the
reservation; Montana preserves civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal lands
and recognizes two exceptions to the general rule denying civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers on nonmember lands.
Subsequent cases further restricted tribal civil authority over nonmembers. In a
messy 4-2-3 decision from 1989, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, the Supreme Court held that the second Montana exception
allows an Indian tribe to exercise zoning authority over some (but not all) of the lands
owned by nonmembers within the tribe’s reservation.96 In 2001, the Court in
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, finding neither Montana exception applicable,
unanimously held that a tribe may not impose an occupancy tax on a hotel operated
on nonmember land within the tribe’s reservation.97 Along the way, the Court
inserted a remarkable footnote into its 1993 decision in South Dakota v. Bourland.98
Holding that two federal statutes had abrogated the treaty rights of the Cheyenne
River Sioux to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing within the tribe’s
reservation, Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court read Montana as a categorical
denial of inherent tribal sovereignty over nonmembers: “[A]fter Montana,” Thomas
wrote, “tribal sovereignty over nonmembers ‘cannot survive without express
congressional delegation’ . . . and is therefore not inherent.”99 Subsequent decisions
of the Court generally have ignored that sweeping statement—although it may yet
prove a prescient summary of the implicit-divestiture cases.
The implicit-divestiture theory has had similar limiting effects on tribal civiladjudicative authority. In 1997, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Strate v. A1 Contractors that a tribal court may not exercise jurisdiction over a civil action
involving nonmember parties on non-tribal land within the tribe’s reservation unless
one of the two Montana exceptions applies.100 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the

94. Id. at 565–66.
95. Id. at 557 (“The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from
hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the
Tribe . . . and with this holding we can readily agree.”). Consistent with that principle, the
Supreme Court in 1982 held by a 6–3 vote that an Indian tribe may impose a severance tax on
oil and gas extracted by a nonmember from tribal land. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130 (1982).
96. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
97. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
98. 508 U.S. 679, 695 n.15 (1993).
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). In a unanimous decision after Montana but before Strate, the
Supreme Court had strongly implied that a tribal court has civil-adjudicative jurisdiction over
nonmembers for activities taking place on nonmember land within the tribe’s reservation. See
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); cf. Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). For criticism of the federal-court actions to challenge
tribal civil-adjudicative jurisdiction, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on
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Court, said that “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”101 In other words, the implicit-divestiture theory,
as articulated in Montana, applies to both civil regulation and civil adjudication.
Then, stating that the Montana exceptions are “limited” and should not “swallow the
rule” or “shrink it,” the Court in 2008 held by a 5-4 vote in Plains Commerce Bank
v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. that, notwithstanding a commercial relationship
between tribal members and a nonmember bank, a tribal court lacked jurisdiction
over litigation involving a claim against the bank arising from its sale of nonmember
reservation land.102
Montana at least preserved tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers for activities
on tribal lands.103 But two subsequent cases have weakened the significance of the
distinction between tribal lands and nonmember lands. In 2001, the Supreme Court
unanimously held in Nevada v. Hicks that a tribal court may not exercise jurisdiction
over a civil suit brought by a tribal member against a state law-enforcement officer
for conduct that occurred on tribal land.104 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
cautioned that the holding was “limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction
over state officers enforcing state law” and that the decision left “open the question
of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”105 But Scalia also
said that land ownership is only one factor in determining tribal jurisdiction and that
“tribal ownership is not alone enough to support . . . jurisdiction over
nonmembers.”106 Contrary to Montana, then, Hicks indicates that the distinction
between tribal lands and nonmember lands is not necessarily controlling. 107 More
recently, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians squarely
presented the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over a nonmember for conduct on
tribal lands (without the complication of state law enforcement present in Hicks).108
The case was argued in December of 2015; after Justice Scalia’s death in February
of 2016, the Court split 4-4 and issued no opinion.109 Four justices, apparently, were

Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010).
101. 520 U.S. at 453.
102. 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008). See generally Dale Beck Furnish, Sorting Out Civil
Jurisdiction in Indian Country after Plains Commerce Bank: State Courts and the Judicial
Sovereignty of the Navajo Nation, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 385 (2009).
103. Similarly, the Court in Strate had left open the question of tribal civil-adjudicative
jurisdiction over nonmembers for activity taking place on tribal land, noting that “tribes retain
considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land.” 520 U.S. at 442, 454.
104. 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (unanimous holding, with several justices concurring in
judgment only).
105. Id. at 358 n.2.
106. Id. at 360.
107. Id. at 375–76 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[L]and status within a reservation is not a
primary jurisdictional fact, but is relevant only insofar as it bears on the application of one of
Montana’s exceptions to a particular case.”).
108. Dolgencorp v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 2014),
aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per curiam).
109. Dollar Gen. Corp., 136 S. Ct. at 2159.
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prepared to hold that a tribe may not exercise civil-adjudicative jurisdiction over a
nonmember even for activity on tribal lands.110
Thus, the transformation of tribal sovereignty from traditional, territorial-based
sovereignty to contemporary, membership-based sovereignty is still unfolding. Until
1978, tribal sovereignty worked much like the sovereignty of every other nation and
every other government. With the exception of crimes committed by a non-Indian
offender against a non-Indian victim, tribes had criminal and civil jurisdiction over
all persons, whether Indian or non-Indian, for all activities within Indian country
(although the extent to which any tribe actually exercised criminal or civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers during that period is, of course, a separate question).
But under the implicit-divestiture theory, first announced in 1978, tribes have no
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders, even for crimes occurring on tribal
lands within Indian country, and tribes have very limited civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers for activities on nonmember lands within Indian country. It seems
likely that the Supreme Court eventually will deny all tribal-civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers, even for activities on tribal lands within Indian country. Hicks opened
that door; in Dollar General, four Justices were willing to walk through it. The
guiding principle of the Supreme Court’s opinions is perfectly clear. Tribal
sovereignty is not territorial; unless Congress provides otherwise, a tribe is sovereign
only as to its own members.
B. Tribal Governments and the Rights Revolution
The Supreme Court’s shift from the traditional, territorial-based definition of
tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, membership-based definition has played out
against the background of two broader developments in federal Indian law and U.S.
constitutional law. First, legislative and executive policy during the century
preceding Oliphant abandoned the longstanding practice of separating Indians from
non-Indians and eventually encouraged the development of tribal political
institutions and tribal economic enterprises.111 An important consequence of those
changes was an increase in contacts between tribal governments and nonmembers
unmediated by the federal government.112 Second, during the decades after World
War II, the Supreme Court abandoned the policy of judicial deference to the political
branches observed by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter in the twilight of
the Lochner era.113 After tentative first steps by the Stone and Vinson Courts, the
Court under Chief Justice Warren undertook to reshape constitutional law by
aggressively recognizing, creating, expanding, and incorporating fundamental
rights.114 When tribal governments then asserted sovereign powers over nonmembers
in criminal and civil proceedings during the second half of the twentieth century, the
latent tension between these two developments became apparent.115
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1. The Decline of Separation and the Rise of Tribal Governments
For much of its first century, the U.S. government’s general policy toward
American Indians was to separate them—physically, culturally, and politically—
from non-Indians. Although there had been early efforts aimed at assimilation,
federal policy under President Madison swung hard toward removal—the forced
migration of Indian tribes from lands east of the Mississippi River to lands west of
the Mississippi River.116 Policy makers could reasonably assume that, because
colonial and early republican settlement had needed two centuries to fill in the region
between the Atlantic seaboard and the Appalachian Mountains, further settlement
would need another two centuries to fill in the region between the Appalachians and
the Mississippi River. Western removal of the eastern tribes thus seemed to offer a
long-term solution to what was known as the “Indian problem.” 117 Tribal members,
for the most part, were not U.S. citizens, and the tribes themselves were regarded as
separate nations.118 Forced migration from their lands would permit the tribes to
preserve their political independence and, of course, open the lands for non-Indian
settlement.119
The removal policy quickly fell apart. Non-Indian settlement took only a few
years—not decades and certainly not centuries—to cross the Mississippi River, and
conflicts arose between non-Indian settlers and both the western tribes and the
removed eastern tribes.120 By 1858, the legislative and executive branches had turned
to reservations as the new long-term policy.121 Tribes would be confined to
reservations, the lands of which would be held by the United States for the exclusive
use and benefit of the tribes.122 The reservation system thus would continue the
separation of tribes from non-Indians. It would allow Indians a measure of
independence—and, again, it would free up most of their lands for non-Indian
settlement. As the nineteenth century wore on, policy makers increasingly looked on
the reservation system as a mechanism to prepare Indians for ultimate assimilation.123
Many tribal political, cultural, and social practices were discouraged or simply
prohibited.124 But Indians largely remained peoples apart within the United States.
That changed after Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887 (also
known as the “Dawes Act”).125 Under the new policy of allotment, federal officials
surveyed reservation lands, assigned parcels between 40 and 160 acres to individual
Indians and their families, held back certain parcels for continued tribal use, and
opened up the “surplus” reservation lands for purchase by non-Indian settlers. 126 The
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motives underlying allotment were mixed.127 Some policy makers reasoned that
Indian economic development on the reservations was held back by communal
landownership; it would be better, they thought, if individual Indians could be turned
into yeomen with family farms (like their non-Indian counterparts).128 Other policy
makers simply wanted to make reservation lands available for non-Indian
settlement.129 In any event, the effect was that federal policy now affirmatively
discouraged the separation of Indians and non-Indians. U.S. citizenship was first held
out as an incentive for cooperation with the allotment policy and then simply granted
to all Indians en masse in 1924.130
The allotment policy—just like the earlier removal and reservation policies—
proved a monumental failure, and Congress formally renounced it with the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.131 But allotment had two substantial and lasting effects.
First, tribal landholdings fell substantially, from 138 million acres at the beginning
of the allotment period to 48 million acres at the end of it.132 Second, reservations
became “checkerboards” of tribal and non-tribal lands.133 Although many
reservations still have a majority of Indian landownership and Indian residency,
others are primarily non-Indian by land or by population. The Port Madison Indian
Reservation, where the criminal activity underlying Oliphant took place, offers an
extreme example. At the time of the Oliphant decision in 1978, more than sixty
percent of the reservation land was owned by non-Indians, and more than ninetyeight percent of the reservation population was non-Indian.134 For many places
within Indian country, allotment meant that Indians and non-Indians were now living
and working cheek by jowl.
Congress replaced the allotment policy first with the Indian New Deal—a federal
effort begun in the 1930s to rebuild tribal institutions and tribal culture, which met
with mixed success135—and then with a policy of termination—a federal effort begun
in the 1950s to destroy tribal institutions and tribal culture, which was largely
reversed once it also proved a failure.136 The current approach is a federal policy of
tribal self-determination,137 variously attributed to President Kennedy, President
Johnson, or President Nixon. In 1970, President Nixon delivered a special message
to Congress in which he called for greater tribal autonomy without loss of federal

127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 78–79. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 conferred U.S. citizenship on all
Indians. Pub. L. 68–175, 43 Stat. 253.
131. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 81–82.
132. Id. at 73.
133. Id.; see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978).
134. Oliphant, 343 U.S. at 193 n.1.
135. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 179–84; WUNDER,
supra note 123, at 63–71.
136. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 184–93; WUNDER,
supra note 123, at 63–71.
137. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 193–108; WUNDER,
supra note 123, at 159–63.
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support—a policy, he said, of “self-determination without termination.”138 The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, along with other
legislation that followed the special message, encourages tribal self-government and
allows tribes to administer many federal health, education, and welfare programs on
their reservations.139
Since the start of the self-determination era, many tribes have experienced
significant political and economic advances. 140 Tribal governments have grown
increasingly complex, often (but not always) involving representative legislative
bodies and the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.141 Many
tribes have well-developed judicial systems, including distinct trial and appellate
courts.142 Tribes determine their own membership; they maintain police, fire, and
rescue services; they impose taxes; they maintain hospitals, health departments, and
school systems; they regulate the natural resources of their reservations; they
legislate for the health, safety, welfare, and morals of their members; and they
operate business enterprises—some of which (particularly in the gaming and tourist
industries) have been very successful.143 In many respects, a reservation resident,
whether Indian or non-Indian, might be hard pressed to distinguish the functions and
the operations of a tribal government from the functions and the operations of a
nearby city, county, or state government. But there is an important difference. A
tribal government remains a tribal government. It is neither the federal government
nor a state government; as such, it stands outside the federalist structure of the U.S.
constitutional order.
2. The Rights Revolution
The placement of tribal governments outside the federalist structure took on new
significance during the post-war years as the Supreme Court turned to the energetic
recognition, creation, expansion, and incorporation of fundamental rights. 144 For both
civil and criminal matters, the Court during the 1950s and the 1960s abandoned the

138. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 P UB. PAPERS 564 (July 8,
1970).
139. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 99–105; Michael P.
Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal
Indian Policy, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1199–1200 (1978).
140. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 98–100; Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 779, 814–820
(2014); Joseph William Singer, Indian Nations and the Constitution, 70 ME. L. REV. 200, 205
(2018) (“[T]ribal governments have revived, they have rewritten their constitutions and tribal
codes, they have drafted laws to protect the environment and natural resources, they have
created or revitalized tribal courts and government agencies, they have embarked on tribal
business enterprises, they have established tribal colleges, they have restored and taught tribal
languages, and they have reinvigorated tribal cultural and religious practices.”).
141. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 98–100.
142. See AM. INDIAN LAW CTR., INC., SURVEY OF TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS & COURTS ON
INDIAN OFFENSES: FINAL REPORT 21–23 (2000).
143. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 99–100, 1320–24.
144. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1–2, 26–27 (1998).
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posture of deference that had defined its constitutional decisions since 1937, and it
began aggressively pursuing a rights-oriented agenda. Although this rights revolution
was most frenetic during the Warren and Burger Courts, it continues even now. But
under the Supreme Court’s long-standing decisions, the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment do not constrain tribal governments.145 That sets up a
conflict between tribal sovereignty and fundamental rights.
Apart from disingenuous rhetoric at Senate confirmation hearings, the idea of
judicial restraint has largely disappeared from contemporary constitutional
adjudication. The extraordinary deference to the legislative and executive branches
urged by Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and others near and after the end of the
Lochner era now seems distant and foreign.146 But even after the turn toward
selective incorporation of constitutional rights against the states during the first half
of the twentieth century, judicial deference—genuine judicial deference—normally
commanded majority respect through the years of the Stone Court (1941–1946) and
the Vinson Court (1946–1953).147 Still, the Court occasionally invalidated legislative
acts trenching on civil liberties and civil rights. In 1943, for example, the Stone Court
in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette struck down a statute that compelled
school children to salute the American flag.148 And in 1950, the Vinson Court in
Sweatt v. Painter ruled that the Equal Protection Clause required that black
applicants be admitted to the University of Texas Law School.149 For the most part,
however, the commitment to judicial deference prevailed under Chief Justice Stone
and Chief Justice Vinson.150
That changed markedly with the Warren Court (1953–1969). Under Chief Justice
Warren, the Supreme Court shifted hard to an energetic exercise of the judicial
power.151 Express constitutional rights—such as freedom of the press, equal
protection of the laws, and the rights of criminal suspects and criminal defendants—
were greatly expanded; other rights, such as the right of privacy, were created or
recognized for the first time; and many rights, whether new or old, were incorporated
against state and local governments.152 The work of the Warren Court was in large
part to lead a rights revolution, and the idea of judicial deference to the political
branches as a safeguard of individuals against the government fell decidedly out of
favor.
It began, of course, in 1954 with the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,153 striking down segregation in the public schools and initiating
the gradual abandonment of Plessy v. Ferguson154 and the desegregation of other

145. See infra Section I.B.3.
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149. 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see also HOFFER ET AL., supra note 148, at 331.
150. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 146, at 246–62.
151. Id. at 275–76.
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public facilities. During the 1960s, the Warren Court validated federal civil rights
legislation. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,155 and in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.156 As the Court found its footing on the rights of black Americans, it also took
on the malapportionment of legislative districts, holding first in its 1962 decision,
Baker v. Carr, that apportionment controversies are justiciable157 and then in its 1964
decision, Reynolds v. Sims, that those controversies should be decided on the
principle of “one person, one vote.”158
The Warren Court expanded the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press and applied those expanded guarantees vigorously
against federal, state, and local governments.159 In 1964, New York Times v. Sullivan
largely insulated journalists from state-law liability for libel;160 between 1957 and
1966, Roth v. United States,161 Jacobellis v. Ohio,162 and Memoirs v.
Massachusetts163 narrowed the scope of obscenity subject to criminal prosecution;
and in 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District upheld
the right of public-school children to protest the Vietnam War.164 In 1965, the Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut located a right of marital privacy amid the “penumbras”
and “emanations” of various constitutional rights,165 and the Court extended that
right of privacy further in its 1969 decision, Stanley v. Georgia, to protect the
possession and viewing of pornography.166
The Warren Court was particularly aggressive in expanding the rights of criminal
suspects and criminal defendants.167 In 1956, Griffin v. Illinois held that indigent
defendants have a right to a free trial transcript,168 and, in 1963, Gideon v.
Wainwright held that indigent defendants have a right to a court-appointed
attorney.169 In 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio applied the exclusionary rule to the
states for violations of the Fourth Amendment,170 and, in 1963, Brady v. Maryland
imposed a duty on the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence to the
accused.171 In 1964, the Court held in Escobedo v. Illinois, that the Sixth Amendment
allows a criminal defendant to have a lawyer present during police interrogation,172
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and, in 1966, Miranda v. Arizona held that the Fifth Amendment requires police to
give warnings against self-incrimination upon taking a suspect into custody. 173
The Supreme Court’s aggressive agenda under Chief Justice Warren produced a
political backlash, and it was hoped or feared (depending on one’s leanings) with
each succeeding chief justice that the Court would reverse course and unravel the
rights revolution.174 Both the hopes and the fears proved misplaced. In the last half
century, the Supreme Court has never pursued a wholesale rollback of the rights
created and expanded in the years between Brown v. Board of Education and Chief
Justice Warren’s retirement. Most of the signal decisions from the early and energetic
years of the rights revolution remain in place. Instead, the Burger Court (1969–1986),
the Rehnquist Court (1986–2005), and the Roberts Court (2005–present) each
continued the creation and expansion of fundamental rights, although at a slower
pace and with a shift of focus. To this day, the Supreme Court continues to define its
constitutional work in no small part as the protection of such rights. Perhaps most
notably, the Court has continued to expand the right of privacy. In 1972, the Court
held in Eisenstadt v. Baird that the right of married persons to possess contraception,
which had been recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, applies as well to unmarried
persons.175 The next year, the Court held in Roe v. Wade that women have a
constitutional right to elective abortions176—a decision modified but not overruled
in 1992 by the Rehnquist Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.177 In 2003, the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas used the right of privacy to strike down state
criminal sodomy laws.178 In 2013 and 2015, the Roberts Court built on the
substantive-due-process theories developed under the Warren and Burger Courts to
require federal and state recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v.
Windsor179 and Obergefell v. Hodges.180
The Burger Court expanded the freedom of the press in its 1971 New York Times
v. United States opinion (known as the “Pentagon Papers Case”).181 The Rehnquist
Court expanded freedom of speech in its 1989 Texas v. Johnson opinion (the “FlagBurning Case”).182 And the Roberts Court further expanded freedom of speech in its
2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission opinion,183 its 2018 Janus v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31
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opinion,184 and its 2018 National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra
opinion.185
Finally, the Supreme Court, after Chief Justice Warren, enlarged fundamental
rights that had long been dormant in constitutional law. The Rehnquist Court
“reinvigorated” private-property rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.186 After decades of neglecting regulatory takings, the Court created
new categories of protected property interests for exactions (Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission in 1987187 and Dolan v. City of Tigard in 1994188) and use
restrictions that deprive a property owner of all economically beneficial use of her
property (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council in 1992189). Then, the Roberts
Court, in 2008, held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to bear arms.190 Two years later, the Court in McDonald
v. Chicago held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment against the states.191 Although its pace and its
focal points have changed since the days of the Warren Court, the rights revolution
rolls on.
3. Tribal Sovereignty and Fundamental Rights
The rights revolution, however, never really crossed the boundary into Indian
country. Under Supreme Court case law reaching back to the late nineteenth century,
tribal governments are not subject to the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment.
And although Congress, in the second half of the twentieth century, imposed select
constitutional provisions on tribal governments by statute, the Supreme Court
maintains that claims arising under that statute generally are unreviewable in the
federal courts. Those points complete the construction of the tribal-sovereignty
trilemma. Federal law cannot simultaneously maintain the traditional, territorialbased definition of tribal sovereignty, the robust constitutional protection of
fundamental rights against governmental power, and the unqualified placement of
tribal governments outside the federalist structure. One of those three must give way.
The starting point for understanding the relationship between tribal governments
and the rights revolution is the 1896 decision of the Supreme Court in Talton v.
Mayes, which upheld the conviction and death sentence in Cherokee court of Bob
Talton, a member of the Cherokee Nation who had murdered a fellow Cherokee. 192
Talton argued that the composition of the grand jury that indicted him did not satisfy
the Fifth Amendment.193 The Supreme Court, by an 8–1 vote (with Justice Harlan in
dissent), held that the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, does not apply
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to the Cherokee Nation.194 The sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation, the Court said,
is inherent; it does not derive from the Constitution, and it cannot be limited by the
Constitution.195 Even when the Court later began the process of selectively
incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states, it left Talton undisturbed. To this
day, the individual-rights provisions of the Constitution remain inapplicable to tribal
governments.196 To use Justice Kennedy’s somewhat artless term, tribal governments
are “nonconstitutional entities.”197

194. Id. at 384.
195. Id. Even assuming that the Court in Talton correctly held that the Constitution
generally does not limit the powers of Indian tribal governments, it is not clear that the Court
correctly applied that principle to the Cherokee Nation because both a treaty and a federal
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into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government and
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that they shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States and
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(1999); James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes: A
Reply to Professor Jensen, 60 MONT. L. REV. 17 (1999).
197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
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That result disturbed members of Congress, particularly as the rights revolution
gained momentum under the Warren Court.198 Over the objections of the Indian
lobby,199 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,200 which applies most
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments as a matter of federal
statutory law. For example, the Indian Civil Rights Act requires tribal governments
to recognize the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of
the press;201 it prohibits tribal governments from conducting unreasonable searches
and seizures202 and from subjecting criminal defendants to double jeopardy; 203 it
requires tribal governments to respect the right against self-incrimination204 and to
provide just compensation for takings of property;205 and it subjects tribal
governments to the limitations of due process of law and the equal protection of tribal
laws.206
Whatever the intentions of Congress, the Indian Civil Rights Act does not bring
tribal governments within the mainstream of the rights revolution. First, the Indian
Civil Rights Act specifically omits certain fundamental rights.207 For example, it does
not prohibit tribal governments from establishing a religion or from restricting the
right to bear arms, and it does not require tribal governments to provide jury trials
for civil cases or to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants.208 Second, in
1978 the Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez that the federal
courts have limited jurisdiction under the statute to review claims against tribal
governments or tribal officials.209 The plaintiff in Martinez sued Santa Clara Pueblo
and its executive officers in federal court, arguing that the pueblo’s rules for
determining membership eligibility for the children of pueblo members
discriminated against women who married outside the pueblo.210 The Supreme Court
held that the claim against the pueblo was barred by sovereign immunity211 and that
the claim against the pueblo’s executive officers was barred by the failure of
Congress to provide federal-court remedies for violations of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.212 With the sole exception of federal habeas corpus review following a criminal
conviction in tribal court,213 the Court said, the only remedies for violations of the

198. SHATTUCK & NORGREN, supra note 196, at 169–70.
199. Id.
200. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04 (2012); see generally WUNDER, supra note 123, at 132–40.
201. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (2012).
202. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2) (2012).
203. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (2012).
204. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2012).
205. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(5) (2012).
206. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012).
207. Santa Clara Pueblo vs. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1978).
208. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); see also Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The
Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Non-Member Indians: An Examination of the
Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before and After Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 70, 73 (1991).
209. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69–70.
210. Id. at 51.
211. Id. at 58–59.
212. Id. at 59–70.
213. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
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Indian Civil Rights Act are those provided by the tribe itself. 214 Consequently, a tribal
court’s application of the rights provisions in the Indian Civil Rights Act need not
correspond to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the corresponding rights
provisions in the Constitution.215
In short, several major developments that came together in the late twentieth
century pushed the Supreme Court into a fundamental reexamination of tribal
sovereignty. First, the demographic changes effected by the old federal allotment
policy broke down the longstanding physical separation of Indians and non-Indians.
By the late twentieth century, substantial numbers of non-Indians lived and worked
on Indian reservations. Second, the new federal self-determination policy
encouraged tribal governments to be more assertive in the development of their
political and economic institutions. For the first time, as contacts between tribal
governments and non-Indians were increasing, tribal governments exercised
jurisdiction over civil-regulatory, civil-adjudicative, and criminal matters without
substantial intermediation or interference by the federal government. 216 Third, the
Supreme Court shifted the focus of constitutional adjudication to the recognition,
expansion, creation, and incorporation of fundamental rights. From the federal level
down to the state and local levels, government in the United States found itself more
constrained by fundamental rights than ever before. Fourth, the Court reaffirmed its
longstanding position that the rights secured by the Constitution do not bind tribal
governments and, for good measure, added that the rights secured by the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 are very nearly the exclusive province of tribal courts.
The result is the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. When it decided Oliphant in 1978,
the Court finally confronted the stubborn fact that it could not simultaneously
maintain, without qualification: (1) the traditional, territorial-based definition of
tribal sovereignty; (2) the protection of fundamental rights against every exercise of
governmental power within the United States; and (3) the wholesale placement of
tribal governments outside the federalist structure of the constitutional order. The
Court understood, however imperfectly, that federal law may provide for any two of
these but not all three, and the Court determined that the traditional, territorial-based
definition of tribal sovereignty would have to yield in favor of a membership-based
definition. Since Oliphant, the Court’s many implicit-divestiture cases have played
this idea out—slowly and fitfully working the idea consistent, if not pure.
C. Resolving the Tribal-Sovereignty Trilemma
Addressing the tribal-sovereignty trilemma forces a hard choice among these
three incompatible objectives. Many advocates of tribal interests of course prefer that
the Supreme Court stand firm with the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal

214. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65–66; see generally Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989).
215. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
216. Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical
Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1193 (2010); see also David H. Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1593 (1996).
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sovereignty.217 That resolution would recognize tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction
over all persons and all activities within Indian country; the nature and the extent of
a tribe’s governmental power would be little different from that of any other
sovereign. But this would require the Court either to bring tribal governments into
the federalist structure or to surrender its stewardship of fundamental rights with
respect to Indian country. Neither option is attractive to the Court.
Bringing tribal governments into the federalist structure could be achieved by
overruling Talton and treating tribal governments like state and local governments
for purposes of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. This would present
significant problems. Most obviously, it has no clear basis in the Constitution. The
sole constitutional reference to tribes—the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I,
Section 8—implies that tribes are distinct from state governments, just as they are
distinct from foreign governments.218 Of course, the Supreme Court has often ruled
without a clear basis in the Constitution, and a decision to overrule Talton would be
binding, even if wrong. A less ambitious approach would be to overrule Martinez
and to allow federal-court review of all claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968. That would achieve much the same effect as applying the Constitution directly
to tribal governments.219 But the Indian Civil Rights Act omits certain constitutional
rights, such as the right to a jury trial in a civil action and the right to bear arms. 220
Unless Congress were to amend the act to pick up the omitted rights, there would
still be gaps between the fundamental rights outside Indian country and the
fundamental rights inside Indian country.
More importantly, bringing tribal governments into the federalist structure,
whether directly by overruling Talton or indirectly by overruling Martinez, would
constitute a serious affront to the political independence and integrity of the tribes.
The point of self-determination, after all, is self-determination; it is, as the Supreme
Court said in Williams v. Lee, “the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.”221 Subjecting tribal governments to the same constraints
that the Constitution imposes on state and local governments would deny tribal
members the full capacity to constitute their governments in the manner they deem
best, to define their civil and criminal laws in accordance with their cultural traditions
and practices, and to use law and government for the perpetuation of tribal religious
beliefs.222 In short, it would bring about the assimilation of tribes into a legal system
defined by non-Indians.
If the tribes were not forced into the federalist structure, adherence to the
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty would require the Court
to surrender its oversight of fundamental rights with respect to Indian country.

217. See infra Part II.
218. The only other two references in the Constitution to Indians are to individual Indians,
not Indian tribes. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
219. This assumes that the federal courts would interpret the rights provisions of the Indian
Civil Rights Act in the same way that the federal courts interpret the corresponding rights
provisions of the Constitution.
220. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04 (2012).
221. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
222. Cf. Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1,
122–24.
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Outside Indian country, all the landmark legal developments of the rights revolution
would remain in effect; within Indian country, a tribe could require loyalty oaths,
forbid the private ownership of firearms, compel adherence to an established
religion, prohibit same-sex marriage, maintain racially segregated schools, and
deprive individuals of liberty and property without the due process of law (at least to
the extent permitted by a tribal court’s interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights Act).
Whether a tribal government actually would commit any of those constitutional sins
is beside the point.223 What matters is that the traditional, territorial-based definition
of tribal sovereignty would permit a tribal government to violate the fundamental
rights of both Indians and non-Indians (again, within the limits of a tribal court’s
interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights Act).224 That result is intolerable to the
Supreme Court.
And so the Court, starting with Oliphant in 1978, has pursued the third available
resolution of the trilemma. Rather than compromise the wholesale placement of tribal
governments outside the federalist structure or the protections of fundamental rights
within Indian country, the Court has sacrificed the traditional, territorial-based
definition of tribal sovereignty. Although it does not frame the implicit-divestiture
theory as a choice among incompatible objectives expressis verbis, the Court at times
has invoked the language of fundamental rights and political participation to justify
its restrictions on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. In Oliphant, Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion argued that “from the formation of the Union and the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested . . . great solicitude
that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on
their personal liberty.”225 He acknowledged that, under the Indian Civil Rights Act,
defendants in tribal-court criminal proceedings “are entitled to many of the due
process protections accorded to defendants in federal or state criminal proceedings,”
but he correctly noted that “the guarantees are not identical.”226 Four years later,
Justice Stevens located these concerns about fundamental rights within the general
framework of political participation. Dissenting from a decision that allowed a tribe
to tax a nonmember’s extraction of oil and gas from tribal lands, Stevens argued that

223. Matthew L.M. Fletcher makes a very good argument that this is highly unlikely.
Fletcher, supra note 140, at 822–23.
224. As noted above, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 does provide for federal habeas
corpus review of a conviction in tribal court. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012).
225. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
226. Id. at 194. Rehnquist observed, as an example, that non-Indians were excluded from
Suquamish tribal-court juries. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Similarly, in Duro, the Court found it
“significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribal governments.” Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990). In a concurring opinion in Hicks (which denied tribal-court
jurisdiction over a nonmember), Justice Souter noted that “the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes” and that, when
applying the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1986, tribal courts need not follow the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the corresponding provisions in the Constitution. Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 383–84 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). Souter also emphasized that “[t]ribal
courts . . . differ from other American courts (and often from one another) in their structure,
in the substantive law they apply, and in the independence of their judges.” Id. at 384.
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“[t]ribal powers over nonmembers are appropriately limited because nonmembers
are foreclosed from participation in tribal government.”227
The Court developed Stevens’ idea further in subsequent implicit-divestiture
cases. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Duro grounded the limits of tribal
jurisdiction in the Lockean notion that governmental power is justified by the consent
of the governed. Kennedy’s opinion emphasized that the Indian prosecuted in that
case by a tribe to which he did not belong was “not entitled to vote in [tribal]
elections, to hold tribal office, or to serve on tribal juries.”228 The key consideration,
said Kennedy, is consent: “The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition
of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be
tribal members. . . . A tribe’s additional authority comes from the consent of its
members, and so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal
authority.”229 And most recently, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Plains
Commerce Bank recapitulated the consent-based rationale for limiting tribal
jurisdiction to tribal members. In holding that a tribal court did not have jurisdiction
over a challenge to a nonmember’s sale of non-tribal land to a nonmember buyer,
Roberts argued:
Not only is regulation of fee land sale beyond the tribe’s sovereign
powers, it runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory
authority without commensurate consent. Tribal sovereignty, it should
be remembered, is “a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the
Constitution.” The Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes. Indian
courts “differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant
respects.” And nonmembers have no part in tribal government—they
have no say in the laws and regulations that govern tribal territory.
Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly imposed on
nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented, either expressly or
by his actions.230

227. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 183 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 446–47 (1989) (“[I]t is unlikely that Congress intended to give the Tribe the power to
determine the character of an area that is predominantly owned and populated by nonmembers,
who represent 80% of the population yet lack a voice in tribal governance.”) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
228. 495 U.S. at 679.
229. Id. at 693 (emphasis added); see also id. at 694 (“Retained criminal jurisdiction over
members is accepted by our precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal
membership and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of
which rests on consent.”). In dissent, Justice Brennan challenged Kennedy’s consent-based
theory of sovereignty: “Nor have we ever held that participation in the political process is a
prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a sovereign. If such were the case, a
State could not prosecute nonresidents, and this country could not prosecute aliens who violate
our laws.” Id. at 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial
Political Activism: Neo-Colonialism and the Supreme Court’s New Indian Law, 38 FED. B.
News & J. 92, 99 (1991). But Kennedy re-emphasized his consent-based theory when he
concurred in the Lara outcome. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212–14 (2004).
230. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008)
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Different members of the Supreme Court have articulated similar concerns at various
times during oral argument of the implicit-divestiture cases. 231
Importantly, however, the Court’s resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma
consists not in abandoning the longstanding commitment to tribal sovereignty but in
redefining it. This redefinition of tribal sovereignty has been particularly difficult to
understand because it has proceeded fitfully and has produced doctrinally messy
results. But the Court’s unarticulated aim in the implicit-divestiture cases seems
tolerably clear. The Court wants to preserve as much of retained, inherent tribal
sovereignty as possible without either assimilating tribal governments to state and
local governments or leaving fundamental rights unprotected against tribalgovernmental power. Strange as it may seem (particularly to advocates of tribal
interests), the implicit-divestiture cases represent a reasoned attempt to address an
intractable problem.232
The Court’s new definition of tribal sovereignty incorporates two organizing
principles, both of which are straightforward, even if their implementation has been
needlessly confused. The first principle is that a tribal government lacks sovereign
authority over anyone, Indian or non-Indian, who is not a member of the tribe. The

(internal citations omitted). For criticism of the consent rationale for limiting tribal
jurisdiction, see Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
329, 355–61 (2008). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L.
45, 94–114 (2012).
231. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, 34–35, 42–43, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–44, 56–
57, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, 21, 37–38, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, 33–34, 36–37, 42–43, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997); Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–24, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
232. There is (at least arguably) a constitutional basis for the implicit-divestiture cases. In
the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller’s majority opinion identified certain “privileges and
immunities” that, he said, “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National
character, its Constitution, or its laws.” 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). Among these, Miller
wrote, is the “privilege of a citizen of the United States . . . to demand the care and protection
of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within
the jurisdiction of a foreign government.” Id. Perhaps, then, the privileges and immunities of
U.S. citizenship include the federal government’s “care and protection” of a citizen’s “life,
liberty, and property” within the jurisdiction of tribal governments? And perhaps the implicitdivestiture cases, which generally deny tribal-governmental jurisdiction over nonmembers,
represent the federal judiciary’s attempt to ensure such “care and protection” in default of
legislative action? One obvious shortcoming of this possibility, however, is that tribal
members are themselves U.S. citizens and, thus, would be entitled the same “care and
protection” from the federal government. But, unsettlingly, that would imply that the implicitdivestiture cases have not gone far enough and that tribal courts should be divested of
jurisdiction over nonmembers and members alike. Such a move, of course, would be a very
serious intrusion on tribal sovereignty. In any event, I am grateful to my colleague John
Harrison for pointing me to the Slaughter-House Cases as another piece of the puzzle.
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justification for this principle, in the view of the Court, is that a nonmember does not
have a political voice in tribal government and cannot have consented to the potential
loss of his or her fundamental rights. That is the idea, at least. It implies that a tribal
government should have no criminal or civil jurisdiction over a nonmember for any
activity, either within or outside Indian country unless the nonmember specifically
agrees to that jurisdiction.
In practice, current law strays from this result in several respects. On the criminal
side, the Supreme Court in Oliphant and Duro originally denied tribal jurisdiction
over all nonmembers.233 But in 1991, Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians, and in 2013 Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction
over certain non-Indians accused of domestic or dating violence.234 On the civil side,
the Supreme Court itself still recognizes tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in
limited circumstances—specifically, for activities on tribal lands, 235 for activities
pursuant to a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, and for activities
that directly affect or threaten the political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare of the tribe.236 That said, the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s cases on the
civil side has been to narrow these exceptions, suggesting that, eventually, the Court
will restrict tribal civil jurisdiction to members (and, possibly, to nonmembers who
affirmatively consent to tribal jurisdiction).
The second principle is that a tribe has full sovereign authority with respect to
anyone who is a member of the tribe. The justification for this principle, again in the
view of the Court, is that tribal members participate in tribal political processes, that
they consent to be subject to the decisions and the actions of tribal government, and
that this consent includes the surrender of fundamental rights as trumps against tribalgovernmental actions. Here, federal Indian law corresponds reasonably well to the
principle. On both the criminal and the civil side, a tribe has extensive jurisdiction
and authority over its members. Subject only to supervening federal power over the
tribe, including possible limitations on the reach of the tribe’s personal jurisdiction
under the due-process requirement of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 237 the reach of
tribal-governmental power over tribal members is generally as broad as the reach of
any state government over its citizens and residents. 238

233. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978).
234. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
made in 1991, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); 25 U.S.C. §
1304 (2013) (amendment made by the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013,
restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for certain domestic-violence and
dating-violence offenses).
235. Again, that was what the Court said in Montana. Later cases, including Hicks, have
pared this back; in Dollar General, four members of the Court apparently were willing to
abandon it entirely.
236. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
237. For example, a tribe may lack personal jurisdiction over a member who does not live
within Indian country. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 606.
Additionally, the Indian Civil Rights Act limits the criminal penalties that a tribe may impose,
even on a tribal member, and subjects tribal criminal detentions to habeas corpus review in the
federal courts. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)–(b), 1303 (2012).
238. Note that the Court’s treatment of tribal members as consenting to tribal-
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My explanation of the implicit-divestiture cases as a resolution of the tribalsovereignty trilemma implies several corollary points that existing scholarship
generally has missed or misinterpreted. First, despite claims to the contrary by
academic writers,239 the Supreme Court remains committed to the idea of retained,
inherent tribal sovereignty. Admittedly, the Court’s contemporary, membershipbased definition is not the same as the traditional, territorial-based definition
advanced by the Marshall Court in Worcester; and, admittedly, the Court’s
contemporary definition is not the same as the definition articulated by Felix Cohen,
the father of federal Indian law. The Court’s contemporary definition is markedly
narrower, and it understandably troubles advocates of tribal interests deeply. But it
is simply not correct to argue that the implicit-divestiture cases represent the
abandonment240 or the abrogation241 of tribal sovereignty. Instead, within the limits
of the contemporary, membership-based definition, the Court’s commitment to tribal
sovereignty remains robust.
This commitment is evident in cases that the Court decided soon after Oliphant.
The Court issued the Oliphant decision—and first announced the implicit-divestiture
theory—on March 6, 1978. Just sixteen days later, the Court decided United States
v. Wheeler, rejecting the double-jeopardy claim of a Navajo who was convicted for
the same offense in both federal court and Navajo tribal court.242 Justice Stewart’s
unanimous opinion in Wheeler held that tribal governments and the federal
government constitute separate sovereigns for double-jeopardy purposes, 243 and it
emphasized that the criminal prosecution of tribal members by tribal governments is
part of the tribes’ retained, inherent sovereignty:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their
existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. 244

governmental power without the check of fundamental rights is anomalous. Outside the tribal
context, a person’s eligibility to participate in a political community—such as a state or a
subdivision of a state—cannot alone justify that political community’s denial of that person’s
fundamental rights. Another, perhaps more provocative, way of putting the point is that the
Supreme Court appears to be less concerned about the fundamental rights of members with
respect to tribal governments than of nonmembers with respect to tribal governments. This
merits closer scrutiny by Indian-law scholars.
239. See, e.g., Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, supra
note 196, at 479.
240. Contra Gould, supra note 27, at 853.
241. Contra Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole Is Greater than
the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 393–96, 440 (1993).
242. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
243. Id. at 322–30.
244. Id. at 323.
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And just two months after Wheeler, the Supreme Court decided Martinez by a 7-1
vote.245 Martinez held that tribal governments may not be sued under the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 because tribal governments have “the common-law immunity
from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”246 Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have generally expanded the scope of tribal-sovereign immunity. 247
Second, the Supreme Court’s contemporary, membership-based definition of
tribal sovereignty does not reduce tribes to the status of private, voluntary
organizations. Arguments to the contrary by several academic writers are not
accurate. Certainly, critics of the implicit-divestiture theory are correct that the
membership-based definition creates a superficial resemblance between tribes and
private, voluntary organizations. Under those cases, the authority of a tribal
government generally extends no further than the members of that tribe—just as the
authority of a private, voluntary organization, such as the Elks Lodge or the
Daughters of the American Revolution, generally extends no further than the
members of that organization. But the nature of that authority is very different in the
case of a tribal government.248 Unlike the Elks Lodge or the Daughters of the
American Revolution, a tribal government has the power to convict its members of
criminal offenses and to incarcerate them. A tribal government has the power to
marry and to divorce its members, the power to make decisions about the custody of
its members’ children, the power to determine the ownership of its members’
property by testate and intestate succession, and the power to compel its members to
pay damages or to comply with injunctive or other equitable relief in civil actions.249
Private, voluntary organizations have no such authority, nor should they. 250
Third, the implicit-divestiture theory does not treat the relationship between tribal
governments and nonmembers as “constitutional” or even “quasi-constitutional.”
Philip Frickey, one of the great scholars of Indian law, uncharacteristically misreads
the implicit-divestiture cases on this point. Frickey argues that “what the Court has
done [in those cases]—without any conscious reflection in its opinions—is to use
federal common law to ‘quasi-constitutionalize’ the relationship between tribes and

245. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
246. Id. at 58.
247. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014); Kiowa Tribe
of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
248. Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1075–76
(2004); see also Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145,
147 (1940); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, supra note
196, at 479; Getches, supra note 216, at 1588; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196–97 (1984). But see
Philip P. Frickey, The Status and Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the United States, 59
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 383, 385–86 (1999).
249. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 216–20.
250. Robert Laurence’s assertion that “[a]n entity that has jurisdiction only over its own
lands and its own members is more accurately denominated a ‘club’ than a ‘government’” is
therefore not correct. Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by
Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in
Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 394 (1995). But see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF,
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
116 (2002); Dussias, supra note 27, at 93–94.
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nonmembers.”251 He suggests that the implicit-divestiture cases work as an Indianlaw analogue to the dormant Commerce Clause,252 and he argues that this quasiconstitutionalization “explains why the Court can pick and choose between members
and nonmembers with respect to immunity from tribal regulation, rather than impose
uniform limitations upon tribal action benefiting members and nonmembers
alike.”253 But this gets the matter backwards. The Court has not distinguished
between members and nonmembers in order to force constitutional (or even “quasiconstitutional”) limitations on the relationship between tribal governments and
nonmembers. Instead, the Court has distinguished between members and
nonmembers in order to impose a firm jurisdictional separation between tribal
governments and nonmembers—precisely because the relationship between tribal
governments and nonmembers is not subject to constitutional limitations.
Again, it bears emphasis that my purpose thus far has been neither to defend nor
to challenge the Supreme Court’s redefinition of tribal sovereignty. Instead, my
purpose has been to explain what the Court is doing in the implicit-divestiture cases
and to show why, in the Court’s view, the shift from the traditional, territorial-based
definition to the contemporary, membership-based definition is a proper resolution
of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. Whether the Court’s position is normatively right
is a legitimate question, and I will turn to that, in a limited way, in the final part of
this paper. But one cannot evaluate the Court’s decisions without first understanding
what the Court is doing and why the Court is doing it. For the most part, the academic
writing on the implicit-divestiture cases has jumped straight to the normative
question without first laying an appropriate foundation.
II. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
Legal scholars working in federal Indian law have offered various explanations
of the implicit-divestiture cases. Among these have been occasional suggestions that
the cases address a tension between tribal sovereignty and fundamental rights, but
these suggestions remain largely undeveloped and skeptical. In particular, they do
not capture the stubborn incompatibility of the three objectives underlying the tribalsovereignty trilemma—the preservation of traditional, territorial-based tribal
sovereignty; the preservation of the tribal governments’ placement outside the
federalist structure; and the preservation of fundamental rights. They perceive that
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers may present a conflict between tribal interests
and the interests of nonmembers, and they criticize the Supreme Court for preferring
the latter over the former. But they generally fail to see that the Court must
compromise one of the underlying objectives, and they generally fail to evaluate the
merits of the other available options.
Frickey, for example, in an article that otherwise finds incoherence in the Supreme
Court’s Indian-law decisions, describes Oliphant as recognizing both “a concern for
the practical realities of political community” and a “civil rights concern,” and he

251. Frickey, supra note 48, at 65 (emphasis omitted). Frickey makes this argument in a
section of his article labeled “Bringing the Constitution to Indian Country.” Id. at 64.
252. Id. at 68–73.
253. Id. at 65.
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argues that “[t]he dual notion of political community and civil rights is the strongest
rationale for the Court’s decision.”254 In a separate article, Frickey suggests that the
implicit-divestiture cases “flatten[] federal Indian law into the broader American
public law by importing general constitutional and subconstitutional values into the
field.”255 L. Scott Gould argues that the “root cause of the Court’s unwillingness to
vest tribes with regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians and
nonmembers is its inability to reconcile the constitutional protection of individual
rights with the tribal conception of group rights.” 256 He says that “[t]here is virtually
no textual basis in the Constitution” for tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers but that
“the rights of individuals to due process and equal protection are hallmarks of the
Constitution and the Court’s modern jurisprudence.”257
Robert A. Williams, Jr., analyzing Hicks, argues that the Supreme Court should
have considered legitimate questions about due process for nonmember civil
defendants in tribal courts,258 and David E. Wilkins, analyzing Oliphant, says that
the majority opinion “was, in effect, elevating the rights of non-Indian American
citizens above those of the extraconstitutional sovereign tribal governments which
are governed and populated by individuals who are also American citizens.” 259
Joseph William Singer argues that the “Court appears to view tribal governments as
racially exclusive and undemocratic, and thus, inherently suspect, particularly

254. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1198 (1990); see also id. at 1219–21.
In an earlier article, Frickey writes that “tribal power to regulate the activities of nonmembers
in Indian country seems to turn on an elusive balancing of the intrusiveness of the regulation
upon the autonomy of the nonmember, the extent to which the tribe has historically exercised
such authority, the importance of the regulation to tribal self-government, and perhaps even
whether the nonmember is a Native American.” Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and
Federal Indian Law, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1989). And Frickey argues that the Court
in Oliphant “was mostly moved by concerns about civil liberties.” Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, supra note 196, at 457; see also Frickey, supra note
48, at 38; Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1770, 1775 (1997); Frickey, Transcending
Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, supra note 196, at
658.
255. Frickey, supra note 48, at 7.
256. L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and
Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 674 (2003).
257. Id. In an earlier article, Gould argues that the Duro decision “seems, if anything, to
be an unspoken struggle by the Court to construe tribal rights over nonmembers in the context
of the Constitution” and that, more generally, the Court in its implicit-divestiture cases “is
simply abandoning the doctrine of inherent sovereignty because it finds the doctrine unsuited
to address constitutional issues that arise when tribal members, nonmembers, and non-Indians
reside in the same territory.” Gould, supra note 27, at 853. “Surely part of the reason” for the
implicit-divestiture cases, he suggests, “lies in the Court’s deference to the rights of
individuals, at least when they are not Indians asserting their rights against their tribes.” Id. at
900.
258. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 145 (2005).
259. DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 211 (1997).
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because existing laws do not allow federal court review of tribal court judgments.”260
David H. Getches suggests that, across its Indian-law docket, the Court “may, in fact,
be more concerned with correcting the perceived injustices of applying Indian law
principles to the rights or conduct of non-Indians,” although he finds that explanation
to be inadequate for “fully half [the Rehnquist Court’s] Indian law cases, where
justice for non-Indian interests is not a significant factor.”261 And in an essay about
the implicit-divestiture cases, Bethany Berger argues that “[t]he liberal objection to
tribal interests is even stronger when the vindication of those interests appears to
conflict with individual rights.”262
But much of the scholarship on the implicit-divestiture cases favors other
explanations. Most prominent have been arguments that the contemporary Supreme
Court has abandoned the foundational principles of federal Indian law, that the Court
is indifferent and even hostile to the rights of racial minorities in general and of
Indians in particular, and that the Court is simply not able to produce a coherent body
of federal Indian law. These competing explanations are not mutually inconsistent,
and they generally treat the implicit-divestiture theory as an indefensible intrusion
on retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. In my view, the explanation put forth in Part
I offers a better account of the cases. But even if I cannot agree that the competing
explanations are entirely right, I cannot argue that they are entirely wrong either.
A. Abandonment of Foundational Principles
One explanation holds that, beginning sometime during the 1970s, the Supreme
Court lost its way in federal Indian law. Following the work of Felix Cohen in his
definitive 1941 treatise,263 this explanation looks to the three decisions known as the
“Marshall trilogy”—Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester—as establishing the

260. Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal
Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 645 (2003).
261. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 297–98 (2001).
262. Bethany R. Berger, Liberalism and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 813, 814–16 (2006); see also Julia M. Bedell, The Fairness of Tribal Court Juries and
Non-Indian Defendants, 41 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253 (2017); Bethany R. Berger, Justice and
the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047,
1054 (2005); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate
Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 375–77 (1994); Frickey,
(Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, supra note 196, at 459; Getches,
supra note 216, at 1575, 1599; Karl J. Kramer, The Most Dangerous Branch: An Institutional
Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional
Determinations, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 989, 997–1000, 1005–15; Laurence, supra note 250, at
412; E. Andrew Long, The New Frontier of Federal Indian Law: The United States Supreme
Court’s Active Divestiture of Tribal Sovereignty, 23 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 43 (2004); Max
Minzner, Treating Tribes Differently: Civil Jurisdiction Inside and Outside Indian Country, 6
NEV. L.J. 89, 100–03 (2005); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal
Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. J. ON
C.L. & C.R. 1, 15–16, 19 (2003).
263. See Getches, supra note 216, at 1574; Gould, supra note 27, at 815–16.
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foundational principles of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. 264 Before contact
with non-Indians, Cohen had reasoned, Indian tribes held all the attributes of
sovereignty; he argued that contact, colonialism, and the expansion of the United
States restricted tribal sovereignty but did not eliminate it.265 Cohen maintained that,
under the Marshall trilogy, tribes retain all attributes of sovereignty except those
surrendered by treaty or other agreement with the United States and those taken away
by act of Congress.266
This explanation argues that the implicit-divestiture theory is inconsistent with
the foundational principles established by the Marshall trilogy. Under Chief Justices
Stone, Vinson, and Warren, the Supreme Court generally followed those principles
closely. The unanimous 1959 decision in Williams, requiring that a civil suit brought
by a non-Indian against an Indian concerning a transaction on tribal land be brought
in tribal court, represents perhaps the highpoint of the Court’s fidelity to those
principles. But during the 1970s, this account maintains, the Supreme Court’s
decisions increasingly drifted away from the foundational principles, to the detriment
of tribal sovereignty. Although a few members of the Court (such as Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun) still generally followed the foundational
principles, the Court as a whole supposedly lost interest in federal Indian law, did
not really understand federal Indian law, and did not fully subscribe to the idea that
Indian tribes are sovereign.
Instead, this explanation argues, the contemporary Court decides Indian-law cases
on normative grounds, setting the law to match the Court’s idea of what the status of
tribal governments should be. The result has been the implicit-divestiture theory and
the erosion of the traditional, territorial-based sovereignty championed by Chief
Justice Marshall and Cohen. This explanation argues, no doubt correctly, that the
implicit-divestiture cases cannot be reconciled with the doctrinal implications of the
foundational principles. And so, treating the implicit-divestiture cases as an
erroneous line of decisions, it generally advocates a return to the foundational
principles and the restoration of full tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers and non-Indians within Indian country.
Getches, a leading proponent of this account, argues that the Supreme Court has
“abandon[ed] entrenched principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that bends
tribal sovereignty to fit the Court’s perceptions of non-Indian interests.”267 In his
view, “Indian rights are losing the limited protection they had as the Court forsakes
foundation principles and expands the ambit of control over Indian tribes to include
not just congressional but also judicial power to redefine and restrict tribal

264. Getches, supra note 216, at 1577–83; cf. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107
HARV. L. REV. 381, 385, 408 (1993).
265. See Getches, supra note 216, at 1574.
266. See id.; see also Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA
L. REV. 5, 20 (2002); Frickey, supra note 264, at 397.
267. Getches, supra note 216, at 1574; see also Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and
the Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 627 (2011);
Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 829–30 (2007).
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sovereignty.”268 Oliphant represents a “sharp departure from foundation principles”
of federal Indian law,269 and Montana “announce[s] remarkable departures from
established Indian law principles.”270 In large measure, Getches argues, the Court’s
implicit-divestiture decisions aim to mitigate “cultural conflict” between Indians and
non-Indians.271 In his view, the Court generally has replaced its adherence to the
foundational principles with “subjective, case-by-case determinations of whether a
tribe retain[s] its inherent sovereignty in particular circumstances.” 272 Thus, “the
Court has assumed the prerogative of balancing various non-Indian interests in order
to prune tribal sovereignty to the Court’s own notion of what it ought to look like.”273
The central claim of this explanation is obviously accurate. The implicitdivestiture cases certainly deviate from the foundational principles established by the
Marshall trilogy. But the explanation is incomplete; it requires more. The explanation
describes what the Court has done in doctrinal terms, but it provides no account of
why the Court has done it. It is not plausible to suppose that the contemporary
Supreme Court is just too lazy or too badly informed to grasp the foundational
principles of federal Indian law. Admittedly, Oliphant was a decision of notoriously
poor quality. Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, whether deliberately or not,
misconstrues the historical record on tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
and its interpretation of the Marshall trilogy is perplexing. 274 But any suggestion that
the implicit-divestiture cases might be corrected by the Court’s close reading of a
few law review articles explaining the foundational principles seems badly
misguided.
The Court must have reasons for straying from the foundational principles.
Getches suggests that the point of the decisions is to mitigate “cultural conflict”
between Indians and non-Indians; others might impute darker motivations to the
Court, such as indifference or hostility to the claims of racial minorities. 275 From the
Court’s perspective, what made sense in the first half of the nineteenth century (when
Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester were decided) or even in the middle of
the twentieth century (when Cohen first restated federal Indian law) does not
necessarily make sense at the end of the twentieth century or the start of the twentyfirst century.
There has been an awful lot of water over the dam since the Marshall trilogy.
Allotment has rendered much of Indian country a demographic admixture of Indians
and non-Indians, tribal members and nonmembers. 276 The tribes, against all odds,

268. Getches, supra note 216, at 1582.
269. Id. at 1595; see also John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes
from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 737–38 (2006).
270. Getches, supra note 216, at 1610.
271. Id. at 1594.
272. Id. at 1612.
273. Id. at 1620.
274. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, supra note
196, at 457; Maxfield, supra note 241, at 402–39; see generally Russel Lawrence Barsh &
James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the
Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979).
275. See infra Section II.B.
276. See supra Section I.B.
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have risen up in the last half century, asserting themselves politically and
economically in a manner not seen for decades (or, depending on the tribe, for
centuries).277 The greater physical proximity of Indians and non-Indians and the
greater political and economic reach of the tribes has substantially increased the
number and the extent of interactions between tribal governments and nonmembers
without the intermediation of the federal government.278 Understandably, legal
scholars who advocate tribal interests do not necessarily agree that these
developments justify the abandonment of the traditional, territorial-based definition
of tribal sovereignty. But surely it is legitimate for the Supreme Court, which, after
all, has been the prime mover of the rights revolution, to revisit its nineteenth-century
precedents on tribal sovereignty in light of these demographic, political, economic,
and legal changes.
In the end, it must be more plausible that the Supreme Court, in producing the
implicit-divestiture cases, has been actively reinterpreting and adjusting its
precedents rather than simply not understanding them or ignoring them without
reason. It is a fair criticism that the implicit-divestiture cases deviate from the
foundational principles of the Marshall trilogy. But the deviation has been intentional
rather than accidental and active rather than passive. The better explanation is that
the Court, whether consciously or not, has redefined tribal sovereignty in order to
resolve the tribal-sovereignty trilemma.
B. Indifference or Hostility to Racial Minorities
A second explanation of the implicit-divestiture cases maintains that the Burger,
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have been indifferent and even hostile to the rights of
racial minorities. On this account, shifting from the traditional, territorial-based
definition of tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, membership-based definition
fits within a larger pattern. Although the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have
continued the rights revolution, they have changed its focus.279 Where the Warren
Court aggressively protected the rights of racial minorities, today’s Court instead
aggressively protects other rights, such as those involving religious liberties, political
speech, and firearms.280 On this account, tribal sovereignty has been a casualty of
different judicial priorities in the years since Chief Justice Warren’s retirement.
Scholars present this explanation in two versions—one moderate and the other
more pointed. The moderate version argues that the Supreme Court has lost interest
in the rights of racial minorities over the past half century; in this version, the cases
cutting back on tribal sovereignty are incidental to the Court’s general apathy about
racial inequality. Charles Wilkinson suggests that decisions such as Oliphant,
Montana, Atkinson Trading Co., and Hicks may be a function, in part, of particular
members of the Court “look[ing] skeptically on assertions of minority rights.”281

277. Getches notes this as a likely factor in the development of the implicit-divestiture
doctrine. See Getches, supra note 216, at 1574–75.
278. See supra Section I.B.
279. See supra Section I.B.2.
280. See supra Section I.B.2.
281. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
253–57 (2005).

132

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:87

Similarly, Getches thinks that the Indian-law decisions of the Rehnquist Court can
be explained in part by the Court’s tendency “to disfavor claims of racial
minorities.”282 And N. Bruce Duthu argues that the implicit-divestiture doctrine “is
overly burdened with historical and ethnocentric biases.”283
Frank Pommersheim thinks that the contemporary Supreme Court has become
“increasingly inimical to tribal sovereignty.”284 He reads the implicit-divestiture
cases and other Indian-law decisions as establishing a “new paradigm.”285 Tribal
governments generally prevail in the Supreme Court, he argues, when they claim
tribal sovereignty “defensively”—that is, to resist the encroachment of state-court
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands.286 But tribal governments generally lose
in the Supreme Court when they claim their sovereignty “offensively”—that is, to
assert jurisdiction over non-Indians.287 Pommersheim maintains that the Court’s
approach in the second group of cases “makes no reference to constitutional,
statutory, or treaty analysis, but instead appears to rest on mere judicial preference;
a preference that often seems to border on fear of, or even hostility to, tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.”288 Similarly, Berger attributes the contemporary
Supreme Court’s Indian-law decisions, including the implicit-divestiture cases, to
“an inability to see tribal interests as sovereign interests or to understand what tribal
sovereignty means to Native people and others.”289
The more pointed version argues that the Supreme Court is actively hostile to the
claims of racial minorities in general and to those of Indians in particular. Ann
Tweedy attributes the implicit-divestiture cases to “the Supreme Court’s increasing
preoccupation with liberal goals in the decades following the Civil Rights
Movement.”290 Tweedy sees in the Court’s “liberalism” an “assimilationist agenda”
and “the racist idea that whiteness connotes neutrality whereas Indianness or color
connotes bias or special interest.”291 And the Court’s redefinition of tribal
sovereignty, she argues, is grounded specifically in social-contract theory—which,
she says, is “a peculiarly Western doctrine that should not be forced upon nonWestern peoples” and which “is premised upon the notion of a homogeneous culture”
to the detriment of “minority cultures.”292 Similarly, Robert N. Clinton argues that

282. Getches, supra note 261, at 317.
283. Duthu, supra note 262, at 355.
284. Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal
Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48, 50 (2010).
285. Id. at 48–49.
286. Id. at 54.
287. Id. at 54–55.
288. Id. at 56.
289. Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee,
Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1911
(2017).
290. Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment and
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147, 147 (1999–2000).
291. Id. at 147–48.
292. Id. at 199; see also id. at 208–210.
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the implicit-divestiture cases derive from a subtle form of “racism/colonialism.” 293
Clinton finds that:
[The Supreme Court’s] preference for political resolution of minority
rights questions is unidirectional—it operates only to protect the right of
non-Indian political processes to control the rights, destinies, and
interests of Indian minorities, but not the right of Indian governments to
affect the rights and interests of non-Indians or non-member Indians who
reside within their reservation and affect the lives of tribal members.294
Williams also offers a harsh condemnation. Surveying the Court’s Indian-law
cases through the end of the Rehnquist Court, he argues that “the language of racism
directed at Indians that was so popular with the justices in the nineteenth century is
still being perpetuated by the Supreme Court in many of its most important decisions
on Indian rights in the post-Brown era.”295 Williams says that the contemporary
Court’s general abandonment of “racist precedents” and “hostile stereotypes” with
respect to African Americans and “the supposed benevolent racial paradigm shift
represented by . . . Brown” never extended to the Court’s treatment of Indians.296
More specifically, he argues that “a long legacy of hostile, romanticized, and
incongruously imagined stereotypes of Indians as incommensurable savages”—
which he traces to the foundational decisions of the Marshall trilogy—continues to
shape the way the justices view and understand the legal history, and therefore the
legal rights, of Indian tribes.”297 Pointing in particular to Oliphant, Williams says
that “[t]he justices continue to uphold a form of legalized racial dictatorship.” 298 He
reads Oliphant as reasoning that Indian tribes are “far too uncivilized to be allowed
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”299 And, he says, the Court’s
racism persists through decisions such as Hicks and Lara. In his view, those cases
“show how a long-established language of racism continues to be employed to
support a jurispathic, rights-destroying principle of racial discrimination applied to
Indians in America.”300

293. See Clinton, supra note 229, at 99.
294. Id. at 98.
295. See WILLIAMS, supra note 258, at xxii.
296. Id. at 87.
297. Id. at xxv. Williams also notes that he “do[es] not believe that the Court is a hopelessly
racist institution that is incapable of fairly adjudicating cases involving the basic human rights
to property, self-government, and cultural survival possessed by Indian tribes as indigenous
peoples.” Id. at xxvii.
298. Id. at xxiv.
299. Id. at 104; see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 219, 265, 267–74 (1986).
300. See WILLIAMS, supra note 258, at 136; see also Dussias, supra note 27, at 88. David
E. Wilkins suggests that the Oliphant decision can be attributed, at least in part, to Justice
Rehnquist’s hostility to tribal interests. “Rehnquist’s version of federalism,” Wilkins argues,
“incurs great difficulty when faced with tribal political status, and his political hierarchy places
tribes lower than the United States and frequently lower than the states and, in some cases,
even county governments.” WILKINS, supra note 259, at 198.
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This explanation, at least in its moderate version, is consistent with the
contemporary Court’s stated project of pursuing a color-blind reading of the
Constitution and generally eliminating race-based distinctions from federal, state,
and local law.301 Such skepticism about differential treatment of racial minorities
almost inevitably takes particular exception to federal Indian law. Not only do
Indians enjoy certain advantages within the legal system—such as the employment
preferences approved by the Court in Morton v. Mancari302 and the adoptionplacement preferences questioned by the Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl303—
but Indian tribes, as sovereigns, stand outside the federalist structure. This
explanation thus reads the implicit-divestiture cases as the Court’s effort to limit and
ultimately destroy tribal sovereignty as a racial preference; in effect, it sees the
implicit-divestiture cases as reaching for the final political, legal, and cultural
assimilation of Indians into American society. 304
But there are problems with this explanation. First, it cannot explain why the
members of the Court who have voted against the tribal governments in the implicitdivestiture cases often include those who generally are among the most solicitous of
minority rights.305 Justice White and Justice Blackmun voted with the majority in
Oliphant; Justice White voted with the majority in Montana; Justices White and
Blackmun voted with the majority in Duro; Strate was a unanimous opinion, with
Justice Ginsburg writing for the Court; Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion
in Nevada v. Hicks; and Atkinson Trading also was a unanimous opinion.306 Why
would the usual defenders of racial minorities’ civil rights join the implicitdivestiture decisions if the point of those decisions were to undermine the rights of
Indians? It seems highly implausible Justices White, Blackmun, Ginsburg, and others
have a particular anti-Indian animus.
Second, it does not explain why the Supreme Court has chosen to redefine
retained, inherent tribal sovereignty in membership terms but, within that
redefinition, to preserve, and in some respects to strengthen, tribal sovereignty. In
Wheeler, the Supreme Court relied on tribal sovereignty to reject the double-jeopardy
challenge of an Indian tried in both tribal and federal court; in Martinez, the Court
relied on tribal sovereignty to hold that tribal governments may not be sued for
violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968; and in other cases since Oliphant,
the Court generally has expanded the scope of tribal sovereign immunity. 307 If the
Court is truly hostile to tribal sovereignty as an impermissible race-based preference,
why has it only redefined—but not abolished—tribal sovereignty?

301. See, e.g., Berger, Liberalism and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law, supra note
262, at 816 (“Measured against a liberal framework, tribal interests may be perceived as
special interests, inconsistent with the principle of equal treatment.”).
302. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
303. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
304. See Tweedy, supra note 290.
305. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 289, at 1912–14; Berger, Liberalism and Republicanism
in Federal Indian Law, supra note 262, at 814–15.
306. See supra Section I.A.
307. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014); Kiowa Tribe
of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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C. Incoherence of Indian-Law Decisions
A third explanation argues that the contemporary Supreme Court’s Indian-law
decisions, including its implicit-divestiture cases, are simply incoherent. This
explanation argues that the Court’s decisions over the past several decades resemble
a random walk—they are inconsistent with each other, and they collectively fail to
produce a cogent body of law. On this account, the Court has no principled
framework—no “organizing method”308—to discipline its analysis. In Frickey’s
words, the Indian-law cases are “largely a collection of ad hoc judicial
assessments,”309 and the implicit-divestiture decisions in particular form “a motley
lot”310 and “lack any sort of coherent core.”311
Frickey considers and rejects the possibility that the Court’s Indian-law cases,
including the implicit-divestiture decisions, reflect congressional intent. 312 Instead,
he argues that the cases generally are driven by one or more of four values:
“enforcing a tradition of protecting Indian rights, avoiding congressional
expectations that are obsolescent in the current Indian context, applying manageable
judicial standards, and defining civil rights by measuring the appropriate scope of
sovereignty within a political community.”313 But Frickey maintains that those values
often conflict, and he finds it “impossible” to arrange them in a way that provides a
consistent description of the Court’s holdings. 314 “Although one or more of the
factors” may explain the outcome in an individual case, he says, “collectively the
factors are so deeply divisive that they seemingly add up to nothing.” 315 In his view,
“foundational theory” and “elemental concepts”—such as the notion that a “tribe is
fully sovereign except to the extent a federal statute, agreement, or treaty says
otherwise”—are “unlikely candidate[s] for resolving particular disputes in federal
Indian law.”316 There is, in Frickey’s view, a stubborn “incoherence” in the Supreme
Court’s Indian case law.317
Consider how the implicit-divestiture cases, taken as a whole, resist the effort to
find underlying cogency. Oliphant, which introduced the implicit-divestiture theory

308. See Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, supra note 254, at 1175.
309. Id. at 1142.
310. Id. at 1164 n.158.
311. See Frickey, supra note 266, at 28; see also Frickey, Transcending Transcendental
Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, supra note 196, at 659.
312. See Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
the Federal Indian Law, supra note 254, at 1160–64, 1184–85.
313. Id. at 1174.
314. Id. at 1203.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1206.
317. Id. at 1174; see also Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, supra note 254, at 1769–76. In the normative portion of
his argument, Frickey ultimately favors deciding Indian-law cases through what he calls
“practical reason,” although that approach promises little, if any, remediation of the
adjudicative incoherence that he identifies. Id. at 1203, 1231–39. N. Bruce Duthu also finds
that the implicit-divestiture theory “lacks coherent structure, definition, or limitations.” Duthu,
supra note 262, at 387.
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to hold that Indian tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
definitely departs from the foundational principles of the Marshall trilogy. 318 That
makes Oliphant an innovation, but it does not necessarily make it nonsensical. And
Duro, which holds that Indian tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians, is generally consistent with the reasoning of Oliphant.319 But
Lara, which holds both that Duro was correctly decided and that the federal statute
overturning Duro did not constitute a congressional delegation of criminal
jurisdiction to the tribes, contradicts itself. Following Oliphant, Duro specifically
said that the tribal-governmental powers “lost” through implicit divestiture 320 are
those “necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States.”321 Any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
“outsiders,” the Duro Court said, would require a delegation of power from
Congress.322 The Court in Lara, however, effectively ignores that part of Duro,
insisting that the legislation overturning Duro “recognized and affirmed”323 the
tribes’ inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians without any
congressional delegation of federal power.324 Whether by accident or design, this
misstates Duro, which plainly indicated that tribal-governmental powers lost through
implicit divestiture could be restored only by such a delegation.325 Put simply, Lara
is trying to have it both ways. 326

318. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
319. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
320. Id. at 686.
321. Id. at 693.
322. Id. at 686.
323. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004) (referring to 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2),
an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, made in 1991, restoring tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
324. The Court in Lara acknowledges that “Duro, like several other cases, referred only to
the need to obtain a congressional statute that ‘delegated’ power to the tribes.” Id. at 207
(emphasis omitted). The Court then tries to cabin that part of Duro:
But in so stating, Duro (like the other cases) simply did not consider whether a
statute, like the present one, could constitutionally achieve the same end by
removing restrictions on the tribes’ inherent authority. Consequently we do not
read any of these cases as holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to
change ‘judicially made’ federal Indian law through this kind of legislation.
Id. But Duro drew a clear distinction between tribal power deriving from retained, inherent
sovereignty and tribal power deriving from a congressional delegation. In reference to
Wheeler, the Duro Court said: “Had the prosecution been a manifestation of external relations
between the Tribe and outsiders, such power would have been inconsistent with the Tribe’s
dependent status, and could only have come to the Tribe by delegation from Congress . . . .”
See Duro, 495 U.S at 686 (emphasis added).
325. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, United States v. Lara, 531 U.S. 193
(2004) (One Justice stated during questions, “Duro said we’ll look at the statute. Congress
didn’t give this power. End of case. That’s all.”).
326. It, of course, would have been perfectly sensible for the Court in Lara to hold that the
legislation overturning Duro was a congressional recognition and affirmation that retained,
inherent tribal sovereignty includes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. But that
holding would not have been consistent with Duro. One possibility is that Justice Breyer, the
author of the majority opinion in Lara, did not want to lose the votes of those who had been
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Matters are still messier on the civil side. Montana, holding that tribes generally
lack civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, is not radically
inconsistent with Oliphant and Duro, but it draws distinctions not drawn by those
cases.327 Montana says that tribes have civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians with respect to activities on tribal lands—a point with no analog under
Oliphant and Duro.328 Additionally, Montana sets out the two Montana exceptions
under which tribes have civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-tribal
lands—again, a point foreign to Oliphant and Duro.329 Strate, which extends the
Montana framework to civil-adjudicative jurisdiction, is consistent with Montana,
but Hicks is inconsistent with both Montana and Strate.330 In Hicks, the Court
indicated that the status of land as tribal or non-tribal is just “one factor” to consider
for purposes of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 331 The lack of cogency on
the civil side is perhaps best illustrated by Brendale, in which the nine members of
the Court were unable to articulate a framework for deciding whether an Indian tribe
had the authority to apply its zoning ordinance to non-tribal reservation lands. 332
The problem, on this explanation of the implicit-divestiture cases, is not just that
the Supreme Court has strayed from the foundational principles of federal Indian law
in general and of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty in particular. Rather, the
problem is that the Court, as a collective, simply does not have a clear idea of what
it is doing or where it is headed. After first announcing the implicit-divestiture theory
in Oliphant, the Court has been unsure how far the theory reaches. Does the implicitdivestiture theory limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians? Duro, Montana,
and Strate indicate that it does; Lara, which validated the legislation overturning
Duro, suggests that it does not. Does the implicit-divestiture theory limit tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers (on the civil side) and non-Indians (on the criminal
side) throughout Indian country? Oliphant and Hicks suggest that little or no
distinction should be drawn between tribal and non-tribal lands within a reservation;
Montana strongly indicates otherwise. The Court does appear to be making it all up
as it goes along.
And yet, that is how adjudicative lawmaking generally works; certainly, that is
the approach followed by the common-law courts for centuries. Each new decision
may move the law and, in so doing, may introduce inconsistencies and incongruities
that require remediation by future decisions or by supervening legislation. In

in the majority in Duro (Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor were in the majority in
each case). That said, Justice Breyer would have put Lara on a firmer analytical basis if he
had simply acknowledged that Congress, by declaring that it was recognizing and affirming
the criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes over nonmember Indians as part of retained, inherent
tribal sovereignty, necessarily took the view that Duro was wrong.
327. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
328. Id. at 557.
329. Id. at 565–66.
330. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997).
331. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360.
332. Frickey calls Brendale “an incoherent smorgasbord of concerns about political
community and civil rights.” Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, supra note 254, at 1200.
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characterizing the common law, Holmes observed that it “is always approaching, and
never reaching, consistency” and that “[i]t will become entirely consistent only when
it ceases to grow.”333 As shown in Part I, the implicit-divestiture cases do point,
however imperfectly, in a particular direction. There is a cogent story to tell about
them: they are the Court’s attempt to resolve the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. Even
if loose ends remain, that explanation fits the implicit-divestiture cases better than
does Frickey’s frustrated conclusion that the cases make no sense.334
III. RECONSIDERING THE TRIBAL-SOVEREIGNTY TRILEMMA
In Part I, I argued that the implicit-divestiture cases—the judicial change from the
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to the contemporary,
membership-based definition—should be understood as the Supreme Court’s honest,
good-faith resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. I presented this account as
a positive explanation, not as a normative assessment. Although I neither defended
nor attacked the implicit-divestiture decisions, I argued that they do not represent the
Court’s wholesale rejection or abandonment of tribal sovereignty, as some scholars
have maintained. In Part II, I argued that the explanation set forth in Part I is a more
accurate account than prominent explanations found in the scholarly literature.
In this Part III, I shift my approach from the descriptive and the analytical to the
evaluative. Specifically, I compare the Court’s resolution of the tribal-sovereignty
trilemma to the other possible resolutions that might be implemented through federal
common law, federal legislation, or constitutional amendment. Throughout, it is
important to bear in mind that the denial of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is
deeply problematic. It is a serious affront to the dignity of tribal governments as
sovereigns. By imposing jurisdictional limitations on tribal governments that do not
apply to other governments, the Supreme Court has taken upon itself the authority to
diminish the tribes’ sovereign status.335 Additionally, the denial of jurisdiction over
nonmembers undermines the capacity of tribal governments to protect the health,
safety, welfare, and morals of persons—members and nonmembers alike—living
within Indian country.336 Even if the Court considers its approach the most attractive
(or the least unattractive) resolution of the trilemma, one cannot ignore that the
implicit-divestiture cases cut very hard and very deep against tribal interests.
What, then, are the other options for resolving the trilemma? Congress or the
Supreme Court could reverse course on the implicit-divestiture cases and recognize
general tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons and activities within
Indian country. That would both reinstate the traditional, territorial-based definition
of tribal sovereignty and preserve the placement of tribal governments outside the

333. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
334. In a later article, Frickey modified his views about the incoherence of the implicitdivestiture cases, arguing that the decisions are unified by the “unstated assumption . . . [that]
[t]ribal sovereignty over non-Indian areas and tribal sovereignty to regulate significant
nonmember interests are inconsistent with what the Supreme Court presumes to be the wishes
of Congress.” See Frickey, supra note 48, at 6–7.
335. See supra Section I.A.
336. See supra Section I.A.
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federalist structure, but it would undermine fundamental rights.337 The trilemma
instead could be resolved by treating tribal governments like state governments for
purposes of the constitutional-rights provisions. That would both reinstate the
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty and preserve fundamental
rights, but it also would force tribal governments into the federalist structure. 338 And
of course, the Court could continue along its current path until it holds, in the end,
that tribal governments have no criminal or civil jurisdiction over nonmembers,
subject to whatever ad hoc exceptions Congress may enact. 339
A. Restoring Territorial-Based Tribal Sovereignty
To date, the Supreme Court has resolved the tribal-sovereignty trilemma by
compromising the traditional definition of tribal sovereignty. But the trilemma could
be resolved instead by compromising fundamental rights. That is, the law could
return to the traditional, territorial-based definition of retained, inherent tribal
sovereignty and continue the placement of tribal governments outside the federalist
structure, thereby taking the position that nonmembers may not assert fundamental
rights as trumps against tribal-governmental action. This approach would not require
constitutional amendment; it could be effected through ordinary adjudication or
legislation.
On the adjudicative side, the Supreme Court could simply reverse course on the
implicit-divestiture cases, overruling Oliphant, Montana, Strate, Hicks, and the
related decisions. As Justice Thomas observed in his Lara concurrence, the implicitdivestiture theory is a creature of federal common law, not of constitutional law. 340
For the same reason, Congress could overturn the implicit-divestiture cases by
statute. Because the cases are grounded in federal common law (and, in fact, purport
to interpret previous legislative and executive action), there is no constitutional
limitation on Congress recognizing tribal criminal or civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers. Congress has already done so, although on a very limited basis. The
Duro fix, passed in 1991, specifically overturned the result in Duro and provided that
Indian tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.341
Amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act partially overturned the result in
Oliphant and provided that Indian tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians for certain domestic-violence and dating-violence offenses against
Indians.342

337. See supra Section I.C.
338. See supra Section I.C.
339. See supra Section I.C.
340. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–23 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
341. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, made
in 1991, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
342. 25 U.S.C.A § 1304 (2013) (amendment made by the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for certain
domestic-violence and dating-violence offenses). As a condition for permitting tribal
governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under the amendments to the
Indian Civil Rights Act, Congress required tribal governments to observe certain individual
rights for criminal defendants. Id. at § 1304(d).
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Of the possible resolutions to the tribal-sovereignty trilemma, this one would
represent the most robust commitment to retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. It
would recognize that tribal governments are separate and distinct from both the
federal government and the state governments and that tribal governments retain the
full territorial jurisdiction normally attributed to sovereigns. In effect, this approach
would treat a tribal government as being every much as sovereign over Indian
country as the French government is sovereign over the lands of France (although,
in the case of a tribal government, subject always to the greater power of the U.S.
federal government). That would go a long way to restoring the authority and dignity
of tribal governments lost through many years of colonialism, confinement to
reservations, allotment, and forced assimilation. Advocates of tribal interests have
proposed legislative and adjudicative reform of the implicit-divestiture cases along
these lines.343
But this approach necessarily would require that fundamental rights give way
whenever those rights potentially conflict with tribal-governmental power.344 That
no doubt would generate resistance across the political spectrum. After many decades
of the rights revolution, the Supreme Court at one time or another has ruled in favor
of rights important to just about every segment of U.S. society—rights concerning
free speech, religious liberty, same-sex marriage, abortion, owning and carrying
firearms, criminal procedure, equal protection for racial minorities and women, and
due process in civil proceedings.345 Even without a showing that any particular tribal
government would provide less protection for fundamental rights than what the
Court’s decisions require for federal, state, and local governments, many would be
troubled by the mere notion that tribal governments would not be constrained by the
rights that otherwise can be asserted against government at any level.
For that reason, the prospects for simply overturning the implicit-divestiture cases
and returning to the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty seem
poor. The political backlash to such an approach could well do more harm to the
independence and the integrity of tribal governments than the implicit-divestiture
cases themselves have done. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has
maintained that Congress has plenary power over the Indian tribes—including the
power to terminate the tribes entirely.346 A perception among legislators and the
public that the only available policy choices are the surrender of fundamental rights
within Indian country or the broad curtailment of tribal-governmental powers could
lead to political consequences that undermine tribal interests generally. At the very
least, those who advocate this resolution should consider the possibility of serious
unintended consequences for the Indian tribes.

343. See, e.g., Grant Christensen, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court Jurisdiction
over Non-Indians: The Case of Trespass to Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527, 527
(2010); Duthu, supra note 262, at 399–401; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and
Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 168–85 (2006).
344. See supra Section I.C.
345. See supra Section I.B.2.
346. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 391–96.
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B. Bringing Tribal Governments into the Federalist Structure
Another possible resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma is to force tribal
governments into the federalist structure. This approach would permit tribal
governments to exercise full criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons and
activities within Indian country but would also require tribal governments to respect
fundamental rights as those rights have been interpreted by the Supreme Court. 347
Although the analogy is imperfect in several respects, tribal governments under this
approach would be treated much like state governments. They would exercise
traditional, territorial-based jurisdiction, but claims that their exercise of
governmental power violate the Constitution would be subject to general review in
the federal courts.
This resolution could be implemented through several different mechanisms. The
most straightforward would be a constitutional amendment recognizing tribal
governments and specifying their place within the federalist structure.348 The
Constitution currently makes only a single reference to Indian tribes. The Indian
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate “[c]ommerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”349 Although the
Supreme Court has interpreted that clause to give Congress plenary power over
Indian tribes (an interpretation that remains controversial), the clause provides no
apparent basis for equating tribal governments with state governments. Additionally,
tribal governments are not mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides
the hook for incorporating portions of the Bill of Rights against state governments.
A constitutional amendment, therefore, could specifically empower tribal
governments to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction on a territorial basis and
require tribal governments to conform to the Fourteenth Amendment and to the
constitutional-rights provisions that already bind the states.
A second mechanism would be for the Supreme Court to overrule its 1896
decision in Talton.350 Talton held that the tribes do not derive their sovereignty from
the Constitution and therefore are not subject to the individual rights protected by the
Constitution.351 But the reasoning in Talton is sound, and it is unclear how the
Supreme Court could justify a different outcome now. After all, the Indian
Commerce Clause includes the only constitutional reference to Indian tribes, and the
tribes, unlike the states, had no role in the ratification of the Constitution or its
amendments. What, then, would be the grounds for treating tribal governments like
state governments without a constitutional amendment?
A third mechanism would be to overrule or to overturn Martinez.352 Martinez
held that, apart from habeas corpus review of criminal convictions in tribal court,
tribal-governmental actions cannot be reviewed in federal court for claimed

347. See supra Section I.C.
348. See, e.g., RUSSELL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD:
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 279–82 (1980).
349. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
350. See supra Section I.C.
351. See supra Section I.B.3.
352. See supra Section I.C.
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violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.353 The decision presented a
statutory issue, not a constitutional issue; thus, it could be undone either by an act of
Congress or by a ruling of the Supreme Court. If the Court overruled Martinez, the
actions of tribal governments would be subject to federal-court review as to the
specific fundamental rights set out in the Indian Civil Rights Act, such as the freedom
of speech and freedom of the press, but not as to the fundamental rights omitted from
the Indian Civil Rights Act, such as the right to bear arms. By contrast, if Congress
overturned Martinez by statute, Congress could enlarge (or contract) the fundamental
rights that would bind tribal governments.354
Under each of the three mechanisms, the outcome would be generally the same.
With the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty restored, tribal
governments would exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons and
activities within Indian country, and the federal courts would have jurisdiction to
review the actions of tribal governments for claimed violations of fundamental rights.
Such reforms have been proposed.355 But the return to full jurisdiction would come
at a high cost to the tribes. Forcing tribal governments into the federalist structure
and, in effect, treating them like state governments, would be a significant intrusion
on tribal independence, autonomy, and self-determination. It would represent the
ultimate assimilation of tribal governments into the legal system and the political
culture of the United States. For any action implicating a fundamental right of an
Indian or a non-Indian, tribal councils, tribal executives, and tribal courts would have
to conduct themselves like their non-Indian counterparts. Tribal treatment of
fundamental rights would have to be at least as protective as federal and state
treatment of those rights, even if the result—as with the intermixing of tribal religion
and tribal government—would be inimical to tribal culture. One might fairly ask
whether this resolution would take more away from the tribes, in terms of legal and
political assimilation, than it would restore to them, in terms of jurisdiction over
nonmembers.356
An intermediate approach could mitigate (but would not eliminate) those
concerns. The incorporation of tribal governments into the federalist structure could
be made elective, on a tribe-by-tribe basis. For example, Congress could amend the

353. See supra Section I.B.3.
354. See, e.g., Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal
Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 427–38 (1988); Levy
supra note 230, at 359. Cf. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW:
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 111–19 (1987).
355. See, e.g., Amy Conners, The Scalpel and the Ax: Federal Review of Tribal Decisions
in the Interest of Tribal Sovereignty, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199 (2012); Gould, supra
note 256; Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil
Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 805-811 (1996); M. Gatsby Miller, The
Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1825 (2014); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common
Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014).
356. Matthew L.M. Fletcher offers a thoughtful and measured proposal for expanding
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers with respect to activities on tribal lands, subject to
review by non-tribal courts for “fundamental fairness” in the treatment of nonmembers. See
Fletcher, supra note 140, at 828–42.
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Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to provide that any tribal government could elect to
become subject to all the fundamental rights applicable to federal, state, and local
governments, with federal-court review for claimed violations of those rights, in
exchange for restoration of the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal
sovereignty. Any nonelecting tribe would remain under the status quo. But it seems
cynical to suggest that such a Hobson’s choice should be fully satisfactory to
advocates of tribal interests. This approach, after all, would require a tribe to sacrifice
a good measure of self-determination.357
C. Conceding the Endgame of Implicit Divestiture
Finally, the tribal-sovereignty trilemma could be resolved simply by letting the
implicit-divestiture theory play itself out to its likely outcome. As matters stand, the
most probable end point of the Oliphant and Montana line of cases is the loss by
tribal governments of all criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, subject
only to whatever ad hoc exceptions may be made by Congress. Advocates of tribal
interests rightly find nothing attractive about this. In their view, the implicitdivestiture cases represent a very serious, perhaps the most serious, intrusion on tribal
sovereignty in contemporary law.358 Why, they may rightly ask, should the tribes
simply give up the fight and accept the loss of territorial-based jurisdiction?
From the perspective of the tribes and their advocates, conceding the endgame of
the implicit-divestiture theory makes little sense in the abstract. But perhaps it has
more to commend it when evaluated against the other possibilities. The first option—
restoring the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty without
protecting fundamental rights against tribal-governmental action—seems highly
unlikely. When framed as a question whether tribal governments should have
criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonmembers without the restraint of fundamental
rights, political opposition among the non-Indian majority becomes too easy to
marshal and too difficult to overcome. The second option—bringing tribal
governments into the federalist structure—would be a hard bargain for tribal
governments. It presents a very difficult trade-off: regaining jurisdiction over
nonmembers but surrendering legal and political independence, autonomy, and selfdetermination. To be brought within the federalist structure is necessarily to be
assimilated—to become the functional equivalent of a state government (or, at best,
an instrumentality of the federal government). Perhaps some tribes might judge the
trade-off worth making, but others might reasonably doubt how expanded
jurisdiction could justify the heavy price to be paid.

357. That said, the National Congress of American Indians adopted a resolution in 2016
advocating this approach. See The Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Combating Non-Indian
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault: A Call for a Full Oliphant Fix, Res. #SPO-16-037
(June 2016), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_orvkZwEdbgGeAHMvJqyzAWvd
DwRXttpGCTmoRcxCStvLSHnXNGv_SPO-16-037%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL65QKZS].
358. See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
There is no good answer here—no resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma
that can be wholly satisfactory. From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the
implicit-divestiture cases represent a fair resolution, a proper redefinition of tribal
sovereignty for the era of fundamental rights. In the Court’s view, the redefinition
preserves tribal sovereignty, admittedly in a different and more limited form, without
compromising the fundamental rights of nonmembers who by definition cannot
participate in tribal government. From the perspective of the tribes and their
advocates, the implicit-divestiture theory privileges the rights and interests of
nonmembers and non-Indians over the rights and interests of tribes. It simply
continues by other means the brutal processes of colonialism and subjugation. And
yet the hard fact remains that tribes are unlikely to see a full restoration of the
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty without being forced into
the federalist structure.

